Proving Lost Profits Under Daubert: Five Questions Every Court Should Ask Before Admitting Expert Testimony by Lloyd, Robert M.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 41 | Issue 2 Article 4
1-1-2007
Proving Lost Profits Under Daubert: Five
Questions Every Court Should Ask Before
Admitting Expert Testimony
Robert M. Lloyd
University of Tennessee College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert M. Lloyd, Proving Lost Profits Under Daubert: Five Questions Every Court Should Ask Before Admitting Expert Testimony, 41 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 379 (2019).
Available at: https://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol41/iss2/4
PROVING LOST PROFITS AFTER DAUBERT: FIVE
QUESTIONS EVERY COURT SHOULD ASK BEFORE
ADMITTING EXPERT TESTIMONY
Robert M. Lloyd *
When a business seeks to recover lost profits, whether the
cause of action is in contract, tort, or antitrust, expert testimony
is the way they prove their loss. An expert witness, typically an
accountant or an economist, presents a model, a set of calcula-
tions intended to show the profits the plaintiff would have made
had it not been for the defendant's actions. Some of these models
are honest, solid evaluations based on the best available data.
Others are pure fantasy. Most are somewhere in between.
When it is not clear how honest and accurate the expert's tes-
timony is, the trial judge has to decide whether to admit it or ex-
clude it.1 The United States Supreme Court's decisions in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 and Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael3 made it clear that the trial judge must act as a
gatekeeper to exclude expert testimony that is likely to mislead
the trier of fact,4 and much has been written to guide the courts
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helpful insights. Lee Baldridge and Jonathan Hollis gave me excellent research assis-
tance, and The University of Tennessee College of Law provided generous support, includ-
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useful insights as I was researching and writing it.
1. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4. In Daubert, the Supreme Court said that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence requires that "the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." 509 U.S. at 589. To assist trial courts
in making that determination, the Court proposed a list of questions and considerations
which it said were not "a definitive checklist or test." Id. at 593. These included whether
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when scientific evidence is in question.5 In spite of all the contro-
versy Daubert and Kumho Tire have generated,6 neither the re-
ported decisions nor the academic literature has given much
guidance for trial courts when the testimony in question is in-
tended to show the plaintiffs lost profits.
This article attempts to fill that void. It suggests five questions
every trial court should ask before admitting expert testimony on
lost profits:
Is the expert qualified for this analysis?
How reliable is the underlying data?
Are the expert's assumptions supported by the record?
Does the expert deal adequately with facts inconsistent with
the expert's theory?
Has the expert considered alternative scenarios?
The questions are not intended to form an exclusive test. There
will, on occasion, be other reasons for excluding the testimony.
But these five questions address the issues that come up repeat-
edly. They are questions that need to be dealt with in every case.
In lost-profits cases, the courts have a long way to go in fulfill-
ing Daubert's purpose, which Judge Richard Posner character-
ized, in his typically blunt language: "to protect juries from being
bamboozled by technical evidence of dubious merit."7 Too often,
courts have admitted misleading testimony with the explanation
that it could be countered by testimony from opposing experts
and by vigorous cross examination.' In far too many cases, juries
the expert's theory or technique can or would be tested, whether it has been subject to
peer review or publication and the known or potential rate of error. Id. at 593-94. Al-
though in Daubert the Court specifically limited its discussion "to the scientific context,"
id. at 590, it subsequently held in Kumho Tire that the "gatekeeping" function prescribed
in Daubert applied to all expert testimony, see 526 U.S. at 141. There the Court reiterated
that "the test of reliability is 'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither neces-
sarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case." 526 U.S. at 141.
5. A search on LEXIS shows 266 law review articles containing "Daubert" in the ti-
tle.
6. In addition to the articles in the preceding footnote, LEXIS shows sixty articles
with "Kumho" in the title.
7. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 247 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1042 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (Posner, J., sitting by designation).
8. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Gaddis-Walker Elec., Inc., Nos. 96-6022, 96-6136, 1997
WL 606800, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 2, 1997) (expert's failure to deduct certain costs could be
corrected on cross-examination); Swierczynski v. Arnold Foods Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 802,
810 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (expert's use of inappropriate discount rate goes to weight of testi-
mony, not admissibility); Spalla v. Navarre Corp., No. 01-598, 2002 WL 31500395, at *4
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were taken in by business and economic experts, and it was only
the vigilance of the appellate court that brought to light the prob-
lems with the expert's testimony. 9 There are undoubtedly many
more cases in which the appellate court, working from a limited
record, was deceived as well. Often, the experts who bamboozled
the jury were faculty from prestigious universities or members of
internationally respected accounting firms.1" A few examples il-
lustrate the point.
Sostchin v. Doll Enterprises, Inc. "1 was a tort case in which a
commercial building burned, and the jury found the landlord neg-
ligent in causing the fire.12 It awarded the tenant the $1.18 mil-
lion in profits the tenant claimed to have lost when forced to relo-
cate its shoe store.' 3 In the four years before the fire, the tenant's
total profit had been $25,862 (an average of less than $7,000 per
year), consisting of a loss of $16,220 in 1994, a profit of $11,833 in
(D. Minn. Nov. 11, 2002) (expert's use of incomplete data in report can be attacked on
cross-examination); Stelwagon Mfg. Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Sys., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1361,
1368 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 1994) (flaws in methodology go to weight of testimony, not admissibil-
ity) affd in part, rev'd in part, 63 F.3d 1267 (3d Cir. 1995).
After reviewing the previous psychological research on the effect of cross-examination
and conducting their own study, three psychologists concluded that, "[a]lthough more re-
search along these lines is needed, this preliminary evidence suggests that cross-
examination may not be an effective safeguard against junk science in the courtroom."
Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology Underlying
Daubert: Legal Decision Makers' Abilities to Evaluate Expert Evidence in Hostile Work En-
vironment Cases, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 180, 193 (2002).
The Daubert opinion itself states: "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary
evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropri-
ate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." 509 U.S. at 596. But this begs the
question. The court still has to decide whether the evidence should be admitted or
whether, even though the other party has an opportunity to counter it, it is likely to mis-
lead the jury.
9. See, e.g., Isaksen v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987)
("The jury pulled the figure of $100,000 out of a hat in which [plaintiffs] expert witness
had done the usual magic tricks. . . ."); Cell, Inc. v. Ranson Investors, 427 S.E.2d 447, 450
(W. Va. 1992) (reversing jury verdict where expert based projections on data for larger
stores).
10. See, e.g., Mid-Am. Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., 100 F.3d 1353, 1369,
1374-75 (7th Cir. 1996) (reversing damages award based on model created by professor
from University of Wisconsin School of Business); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
Cont'l Baking Co., 942 F.2d 1332, 1341 (9th Cir. 1991) (verdict reduced on appeal to extent
based on national accounting firm's unsupported assumption as to profit margin),
amended, in part, on reh'g, 981 F.2d 1023 (1992) Johnson Elec. N. Am., Inc. v. Marbuchi
Motor Am. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 268, 273, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (excluding the testimony
of a CalTech economics professor).
11. 847 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
12. Id. at 1124-25.
13. Id. at 1125.
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1995, a loss of $1,513 in 1996, and a profit of $31,762 in 1997.1'
By selectively interpreting figures, the tenant's expert witness, a
certified public accountant, concluded that the store's profits were
growing at a rate of 35.26% per annum and that the store would
have earned $1.2 million in profits over the remaining six years of
the lease.1" In other words, he testified that the store's average
annual profits in the last six years of the lease would have been
more than twenty-five times those of the first four years. And the
jury believed him. This was in spite of the fact that the store was
located in a high-crime area of downtown Miami and that it re-
opened with the same employees six weeks after the fire and a
block and a half away from its original location, incurring con-
tinuous losses until its owners gave up and closed it.' 6 Moreover,
the store's pre-fire profits had been even less than the accountant
claimed, because his calculations had counted as profits what
were actually the salaries of the company's officers. 17
Although the jury was taken in, the Florida District Court of
Appeals was not. In reversing the jury verdict on damages, the
court characterized the expert's work as "accounting alchemy by
which this humble enterprise was transformed into an engine of
commerce.""8 It explained that the "fire was not the purchase of a
winning lottery ticket."19
In another case alleging both breach of contract and antitrust
violations, the plaintiffs expert opined that the defendant's ac-
tions had cost the plaintiff $54 million in lost profits. 20 This was
in spite of the fact that the plaintiff had been organized as a tax
shelter and had internally projected that its total profits over ten
years would be only $1.4 million.2' To arrive at his $54 million
damage figure, the expert projected that the plaintiff would have
been able to purchase telex terminals for $2,400 each and that it
would have made a profit of $4,576 (discounted to present value)
14. See id. at 1125.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 1125-26.
18. Id. at 1125.
19. Id. at 1129.
20. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co, 797 F.2d 370, 382 (7th Cir.
1986).
21. Id.
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on each of 11,800 terminals it planned to purchase.22 This was in
spite of the fact that the plaintiff had numerous competitors,
most of them (unlike the plaintiff) having representatives calling
on customers.23 The district court jury bought this scenario, and
awarded the plaintiff the full $54 million.24 The Seventh Circuit
reversed on the grounds that there had been no breach of contract
and no antitrust violation.25 In its opinion, however, the Seventh
Circuit felt compelled to comment on the damage verdict which it
characterized as "astonishing" and having been a result of the ex-
pert having "dazzled the jury."26 The court noted that the expert's
projections would have given the plaintiff a rate of return of 191
percent on its investment, an impossible rate for a business that
had many competitors and no substantial advantages over
them. 27
In these cases, the reported opinions do not tell whether the
glaring deficiencies in the expert testimony were pointed out to
the jury or whether it was only in the appellate court that the de-
fendants showed how grossly the experts had overstated the prof-
its. But, in Mid-America Tableware, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co.,28
the Seventh Circuit included with its opinion a lengthy appendix
in which it detailed all of the damaging admissions that the de-
fendant's counsel had obtained from the plaintiffs experts.29 In
spite of these admissions, the jury had returned a verdict the
court characterized as "'monstrously' excessive and find[ing] no
rational basis in the evidence."3 The defendant had breached a
contract to produce a line of harvest-themed dinnerware for the
plaintiff.31 The plaintiffs economics expert, a member of the
graduate business school faculty at a prestigious university, cal-
culated that the plaintiff would have earned average profits of
more than $300,000 per year from the line over a ten-year period,
in spite of evidence that no similarly themed dinnerware had ever
22. Id.
23. See id. at 373.
24. Id. at 382-83.
25. See id. at 381-82.
26. Id. at 382.
27. See id.
28. 100 F.3d 1353 (7th Cir. 1996).
29. Id. at 1369-77.
30. Id. at 1367 (internal quotation marks omitted).
31. Id. at 1356.
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achieved sales in excess of $150,000 per year.32 The defendant's
attorneys had not only produced their own expert who pointed out
the flaws in the plaintiffs experts' testimony, but had also ob-
tained many damaging admissions from the plaintiffs experts.33
These admissions should have shown the jury that the lost profits
calculation of the plaintiffs expert was, in the words of the appel-
late court, "one speculative inference heaped upon another."34 The
sales projections assumed that the plaintiffs dinnerware line
would equal the success of one uniquely successful line of dinner-
ware that had many advantages the plaintiffs line lacked. These
advantages included having the pattern inked into the ceramic,
rather than applied as a decal as was done on the plaintiffs
pieces.35 Moreover, virtually all of the retailers the plaintiff
brought in to testify that they planned to buy the dinnerware
admitted on cross examination that they could not project future
sales until they saw how the product actually sold in their
stores.36 The plaintiffs expert economist himself admitted on
cross examination that he had conducted no market research on
the themed dinnerware and had in fact conducted no research of
any kind on the dinnerware industry.37 He admitted, in fact, that
he had based calculations solely on information the plaintiffs
president had supplied and which he (the expert) had done noth-
ing to verify except to read the documents that existed in the liti-
gation.36 In spite of all the contrary evidence, the jury bought the
expert's story. The award that the Seventh Circuit described as
"'monstrously excessive'" substantially "tracked" the expert's tes-
timony.39
These were situations in which vigorous cross-examination was
not sufficient to make the jury aware of what, to sophisticated ob-
servers, were obvious defects in the testimony.4 ° Of course, the
32. Id. at 1368, 1374-75.
33. Id. at 1375-77.
34. Id. at 1368.
35. See id. at 1370.
36. See id. at 1370-74.
37. Id. at 1375.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1367, 1368 n.8.
40. In DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Electro Minerals Corp., 990 F.2d 1186,
1204-05 (11th Cir. 1993), the appellate court believed that the trial court, which reviewed
the evidence more than a year after the verdict, misunderstood the economist's testimony
on lost profits. If a U.S. district court judge, reading from a written transcript, misunder-
stands this complex evidence, it is easy to assume that many lay jurors would do the same.
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sophisticated observers were not listening to the testimony at the
end of a long and boring trial.
To understand one reason why vigorous cross-examination is
not enough to protect against testimony of this kind, consider
what one expert witness told his audience at a meeting. A court
opinion quoted his lesson on how to defeat cross-examination:
I used the technique as [sic] science as a foreign language. I made a
statement to the attorney that absolutely nobody could understand.
Now, what it amounts to, it's going to terminate the cross examina-
tion, and it's going to terminate it in a hurry.
I want the jury to understand what I say when I feel there are cer-
tain conditions. Under direct examination, the jury understands eve-
rything that I say. Under cross examination, there are some things I
will allow the jury to understand and there are some things which I
will not allow the jury to understand.
[.. (If opposing counsel] says "Can you simplify it?" You say, "See,
there's too much simplification already. This is the only way that I
can state it to you so there will be no misunderstanding."
41
While this advice pertained to scientific evidence, economics and
accounting can be made every bit as arcane as science.
Many have put the blame for biased expert testimony on the
prevalence of the so-called "hired guns," professionals who earn a
large part of their income from acting as expert witnesses.42
Judge Posner, however, takes the opposite position. He argues
that the need to earn an income as an expert witness provides an
important safeguard against overly biased testimony.43 If a court
41. Sanchez v. Black Bros. Co., 423 N.E.2d 1309, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (quoting
speech by Mr. Ralph Barnett) (emphasis omitted).
42. See DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE-
EXPERT EVIDENCE § 10.3.1 (2004) (collecting and summarizing criticism). Since at least
1887, judges, lawyers, academics, and even expert witnesses themselves have called for
the use of court appointed neutral experts. See id. at § 10.4.1 (collecting and summarizing
sources). But still "neutral experts remain the rare exception in the swamp of party-
selected expert witnesses." Id. This is in spite of Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which specifically authorizes judges to appoint neutral experts. FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
43. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 3
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1999, at 91, 93-94. But in Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co, 797 F.2d 370, 382 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner described a jury verdict
which he thought "bore no relation ... to economic reality" as "one more illustration of the
old problem of expert witnesses who are 'often the mere paid advocates or partisans of
2007]
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criticizes an expert for biased testimony, that criticism will be
used against the expert in other trials, thereby reducing his or
her value as a witness.4 4 A few years ago, Judge Posner proposed
a national registry for information about expert witnesses.4" With
respect to economic experts, this function is now performed by the
Economics Department of the University of Missouri-St. Louis.46
The department maintains a web site which lists cases in which
economic experts have testified, naming the expert witness and
summarizing the testimony and the court's evaluation of it.
47
Readily available information about prior testimony can pro-
vide an incentive for experts to be more conservative (no one be-
lieves they will become impartial, only that they will be less in-
clined to render extreme opinions). But it will be effective only if
the courts are willing to exclude testimony when the expert ex-
ceeds the bounds of what can be reasonably extrapolated from the
evidence. If courts allow an expert to exceed reasonable bounds
and the expert is able to convince a jury to render a particularly
outrageous verdict, that expert will be more in demand as a wit-
ness.
48
I. IS THE EXPERT QUALIFIED FOR THIS ANALYSIS?
The trial judge needs to look beyond the fact that the expert is
a well qualified professional with advanced degrees and years of
relevant experience, and ask whether the expert is qualified to
those who employ or pay them, as much so as the attorneys who conducted the suit.'"
(quoting Keegan v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R., 26 Minn. 90, 95 (1899)).
44. Posner, supra note 43, at 94.
45. See id. at 98.
46. Forensic Economics, Univ. Mo.-St. Louis, Court Decisions of Special Interest to
Forensic Economists, http://www.umsl.edu/divisions/artscience/economics/ForensicEcono
mics/CasesFE.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2006).
47. See id.
48. Cf Jonathan T. Tomlin & David R. Merrell, The Accuracy and Manipulability of
Lost Profits Damages Calculations: Should the Trier of Fact be "Reasonably Certain?" 7
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 295, 304 (2006) (stating that financial experts may expect
more business if they provide results favorable to client).
A paper by two economists, both of whom have considerable experience in high-stakes
litigation, uses game theory to demonstrate that the admission of biased expert testimony
will lead to damage awards favoring the party providing the more biased testimony and
that where both parties provide equally biased testimony, the biases will not cancel each
other out as commonly supposed, but will often result in awards that substantially exceed
the actual damage amount. Jonathan T. Tomlin & David Cooper, The Importance of Unbi-
ased Expert Testimony (May 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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make this analysis.49 This may require some careful study by the
court (assisted, of course, by briefs of counsel).5"
In some situations, courts should be willing to allow experts to
testify on the basis of their general background in a field such as
accounting or economics. For example, where the projected reve-
nues and expenses are already in evidence and the expert merely
needs to calculate the profits so as to come up with a number that
is comprehensible to the jury, an accountant with no expertise in
the industry in question would be perfectly capable of rendering
an opinion as to the amount of profits the plaintiff has lost.51 On
the other hand, where the expert is going to project the sales and
market share growth that the plaintiff would have achieved ab-
sent the defendant's conduct, the expert is going to need special-
ized knowledge, and a generalist just will not qualify.52 As one
judge noted:
[I]t must be recognized that a witness' justifiable patina, which may
be conferred by his or her status as an expert in some acknowledged
field of expertise, poses a special danger that the trier of fact may ex-
tend a comparable credence to the witness' opinions that fall outside
of that area of expertise.
53
49. See, e.g., Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 544, 571 (2003)
("[T]he issue is not the qualifications of the witness in the abstract or in general but
'whether those qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to answer a specific ques-
tion.'") (quoting Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1351 (6th Cir. 1994)); Ways &
Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, 705 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (finding insufficient evi-
dence that "medical research economist" had expertise in survey-research).
50. Scrutiny of the expert's report can help in this regard. One survey of federal
judges indicated that one of the effects of exchanging expert reports was that it discour-
ages testimony that is outside the expert's areas of expertise. Carol Krafka et al., Judge
and Attorney Experiences, Practices and Concerns Regarding Expert Testimony in Federal
Civil Trials, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 309, 313 n.2 (2002).
51. See, e.g., In re Merritt-Logan, Inc., 901 F.2d 349, 360 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that a
CPA could testify as to how lost profits were calculated where he did not express an opin-
ion on underlying projections); cf. Supply & Bldg. Co. v. Estee Lauder Int'l, Inc., 57 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. (West) 1309, 1312 n.3, 1316 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that an accountant with-
out relevant experience in the Middle East was qualified to testify as to the opposing ex-
pert's mathematical and accounting errors).
52. See, e.g., R.S.E., Inc, v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 954, 966 (M.D. Pa. 1981)
(finding that a damage-model prepared by a lawyer-economist could not be relied upon in
pre-Daubert antitrust case because he was not an expert in road construction or blacktop
production). But see Polymer Dynamics, Inc v. Bayer Corp., 67 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (West)
201, 204 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (allowing a financial economist to make projections as to growth
of footwear company in spite of having no expertise in footwear industry).
53. Kay v. First Cont'l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772, 775 (N.D. Ill. 1997). At the
time he wrote the majority opinion, Senior District Judge Milton I. Shadur was a member
of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the
2007]
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A few examples illustrate how some courts have excluded tes-
timony of acknowledged experts who attempted to go beyond
their areas of expertise.
In Chemipal Ltd. v.'Slim-Fast Nutritional Foods International,
Inc., 54 a manufacturer of diet foods was sued by its Israeli dis-
tributor for failing to provide promised promotional support.
5
The court excluded the testimony of the distributor's damages ex-
pert because, among other reasons, the expert had no experience
with slimming products and could not relate his knowledge of the
sales growth of beer, chocolate, and cosmetics to the potential
sales growth of the slimming products at issue. 56
In another case, the court said of a marketing professor who
had taught at some of the nation's most prestigious business
schools: "Dr. Frank has an impressive list of qualifications .... He
certainly possesses the specialized knowledge to qualify him as
an expert witness under the proper circumstances. Whether an
expert qualifies to answer specific questions in a particular case
is a different issue."57 The court went on to reject the expert's tes-
timony because, among other reasons, he had never before made
a twenty-year sales projection.58
M.S. Distributing Co. v. Web Records, Inc. 59 presented a similar
situation. The principal of a record company sought to testify as
an expert in order to project the sales lost when the defendant
breached a distribution agreement.6" The court excluded her ex-
pert testimony because her experience was dated, the business
had changed while she had been out of it, and her experience in
rock and roll did not transfer to hip-hop, country, or comedy.6'
In contrast, where the expert seeks to testify on principles that
are not limited to a particular field, then the fact that the expert
United States. Id. at 774 n.2.
54. 350 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. Del. 2004).
55. Id. at 584.
56. See id. at 593; cf TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 728-29 (10th
Cir. 1993) (ruling that familiarity with the Israeli market did not qualify a witness to pro-
ject sales in Venezuela).
57. Pfizer, Inc. v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., No. 97C-04-037-WTQ, 1999 Del. Super.
LEXIS 330, at *15 n.9 (Sept. 2, 1999) (citation omitted).
58. Id. at *24.
59. No. 00 C 1436, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8078 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2003).
60. See id. at *30, *31 & n.4.
61. See id. at *31 n.4.
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has no experience in the industry should not be grounds for ex-
cluding the testimony. TC Systems Inc. v. Town of Colonie6 2 in-
volved the question of whether a fee based on gross revenues was
a reasonable way for a town to charge telecommunications com-
panies for the use of its rights of way.63 The town offered as an
expert witness an economist who specialized, not in telecommuni-
cations, but in U.S.-Asia trade.64 The court nevertheless allowed
him to testify because his testimony involved only broad general
principles of economics.65
In a libel case, a U.S. District Court accepted an accountant's
testimony even though the accountant had no experience calcu-
lating damages for libel.66 The court held: "Calculations for lost
profits and damages are the same whether the case is about
breach of contract or libel, and they do not require any specialized
knowledge of a specific area of the law."6" Similarly, where the
plaintiffs, Mexican nationals, had been defrauded in a U.S. real
estate development scheme, the court allowed an economist with
no real estate development expertise to testify as to the amount
the plaintiffs would have earned if they had invested the same
amount in an average American real estate investment trust
(REIT).6" Once it was established that the measure of damages
was the profits that would have been earned on such an invest-
ment, calculating those profits was something that an economist,
even an economist without specialized experience, was well quali-
fied to do.69
62. 213 F. Supp. 2d 171 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
63. Id. at 173.
64. Id. at 174.
65. See id. at 174-75.
66. Lieberman v. Am. Dietetic Ass'n, No. 94 C 5353, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13143, at
*10-12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1996).
67. Id. at *13 n.2.
68. Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 665 (11th Cir. 2001); cf Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v.
Qantel Corp., 740 F.2d 59, 66-67 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that a CPA could testify as to lost
profits where testimony consisted of extrapolating from forecasts made by the adverse
party); Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, 717 A.2d 724, 733 (Conn. 1998)
("Some economists' and accounting professionals' skills may be transferred between indus-
tries.").
69. See Maiz, 253 F.3d at 665; cf. Elizabeth A. Evans, Interaction Between Account-
ants and Economists, in LITIGATION SERVICEs HANDBOOK: THE ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL
EXPERT § 3.1 (Roman L. Weil et al. eds., 3d ed. 2001) ( "[Economists] know where to find
the data and what biases the data may have.").
20071
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On the other hand, lawyers often try to use economists and, es-
pecially, accountants for things that go far beyond their exper-
tise.7" It's tempting to do so because the client's accountant is
available and is already familiar with the client's business. More-
over, jurors (and even some judges) seem to think of CPAs as all-
around business experts. 71 But, courts need to keep in mind that
what accountants are trained to do is calculate and report on past
profits.72 In spite of the fact that many CPAs have qualified as
business appraisers or lost profits analysts,73 the mere fact that a
person has years of experience as a CPA does not automatically
qualify them as an expert to predict future profits or value a
business. 4
It should be clear, too, that a witness may be qualified to testify
as to one aspect of the damages in a case and not as to others.75 A
marketing expert might be qualified to project sales but not to
opine as to the net profits the plaintiff would earn from that level
of sales, and a CPA might be able to determine the profits that
would result from a given level of sales, but not to opine on
whether the plaintiffs sales would reach such a level.76
70. See, e.g., Hunters Int'l Mfg. Corp. v. Christiana Metals Corp., 561 F. Supp. 614,
617 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding CPA not qualified to testify as to profits of a new and un-
tried business); AGF, Inc. v. Great Lakes Heat Treating Co., 555 N.E.2d 634, 640 (Ohio
1990) (CPA not qualified as an expert in the heat treating business).
71. For a comparison of the areas of expertise of accountants and economists, see Ev-
ans, supra note 69, §§ 3.1-3.
72. See Sofia Adrogu6 & Alan Ratliff, Kicking the Tires After Kumho: The Bottom Line
on Admitting Financial Expert Testimony, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 431, 477-78 (2000) (describ-
ing the training of accountants).
73. See, e.g., Engineered Prods. Co. v. Donaldson Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 951, 1008-11
(N.D. Iowa 2004).
74. See, e.g., Acker v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 347 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1031
(D. Kan. 2004) (CPA admitted he was not qualified as an expert in lost profit projections);
Sun Ins. Mktg. Network, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1245 (M.D. Fla.
2003) (testimony of expert as to the value of a business stricken because he "is a forensic
accountant, not a business appraiser"); Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz,
717 A.2d 724, 732 (Conn. 1998) ("[An accounting degree alone should not qualify a wit-
ness to testify that a given volume of sales, for example, will continue in the future.") (in-
ternal quotations omitted).
75. A criminal case provides a vivid example. Where the defendant in a ritual killing
case sought to introduce testimony of a professor of religious studies who specialized in the
occult, the court allowed him to testify as to the general tenets of Satanism, but it did not
allow him to testify as to the effects of satanic beliefs on the psyche of an individual. State
v. Roland, 808 S.W.2d 855, 858-59 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). The court noted that the professor
had no degree in psychology or psychiatry and that he had no empirical knowledge of the
effect of satanic beliefs on individuals. Id. at 859.
76. In order to make such a calculation, the expert would, of course, have to forecast
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When they consider how strict to be in requiring specialized
qualifications, courts need to take into account the amount at
stake in the case. No court seems to have articulated this, but it
probably underlies the expressed reasoning in many of the deci-
sions discussed above. Where the amount at stake is relatively
small, it is not fair to require a party to conduct a nationwide
search to find the individual best qualified to opine on the par-
ticular issue, especially when there may be several distinct areas
of testimony that might call for different areas of expertise and
thus require different experts.77 On the other hand, where there
are tens or hundreds of millions of dollars at stake and the party
clearly has the resources to find and hire the people best qualified
to testify, a court should not accept less. The fact that counsel
chose someone not among the top people in the field should lead
the court to suspect that the better-qualified experts would have
given less-favorable testimony.7"
II. How RELIABLE IS THE UNDERLYING DATA?
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows an expert to
rely not only on facts or data not in evidence, but also on facts or
data that would not be admissible into evidence. 79 The rule tem-
pers this by requiring the facts or data to be "of a type reasonably
expenses as a percentage of sales. But, in most businesses expenses as a percentage of
sales can be forecast with much less uncertainty than can sales themselves. But see Ken-
ford Co. v. County of Erie, 489 N.Y.S.2d 939, 948 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), affd in part, 493
N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1986) (rejecting assumptions that "various expenses would be a percent-
age of gross revenue").
77. Cf. Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 n.1 (3d Cir. 1996) (admit-
ting testimony of expert because requiring better qualified experts would "unjustly in-
crease litigation costs by requiring litigants in countless cases to hire a host of experts ...
in personal injury cases").
78. See Posner, supra note 43, at 94 (stating that the choice of an economist testifying
outside of his or her field "implies that the lawyer was unable to find a knowledgeable
economist willing to testify in support of the client's position"); cf Grantham & Mann, Inc.
v. Am. Safety Prods., Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 603 (6th Cir. 1987) ("If a party could produce bet-
ter evidence than that which is introduced, the presumption is that the better evidence
would be detrimental . . . ."); S. Pac. Commc'ns Co. v. AT&T, 556 F. Supp. 825, 1090
(D.D.C. 1982) (noting that an antitrust plaintiff has "an obligation to come forward with
the best, most accurate measure of damages that is reasonably available .... Failure to
come forward with the relevant evidence produces a presumption that the actual data is
adverse to plaintiffs' claims.").
79. See FED. R. EVID. 703.
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relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject.""°
It is important to note that the test is not whether the trial
judge thinks the data is reliable, but whether the data is of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field. In a pre-
Daubert case, one district judge developed his own six-factor test
for the reasonableness of reliance on data in lost profits cases and
other "cases outside the 'mainstream' of Rule 703,' 81 but the
Third Circuit reversed him on that point because the appropriate
standard is not what the court deems reliable, but what experts
in the field deem reliable. 2 Still, where the expert's testimony re-
lies on inadmissible evidence, the trial court has a duty to make
an independent factual determination of whether the information
the expert is relying upon is in fact of a type reasonably relied on
by experts in the field.8 3 To fail to do so invites reversal.8 4
This raises the question, for what purposes do experts rely on
this data? Outside of litigation, experts often use data of ques-
tionable reliability for one purpose when they would not think of
using it for another.85
Two academic economists (one of whom has practiced as a
CPA) have considered this question in some detail in an article
discussing the types of financial statements that should be used
to determine lost profits.8 6 They note that when CPAs attach
80. Id.
81. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313, 1330 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
82. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 282 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, sub. nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574 (1986).
83. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 853 (3d Cir. 1990); 4 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 703.04[1] (Joseph
M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2006); see also U.S. Info. Sys. v. IBEW Local
Union No. 3, 313 F. Supp. 2d 213, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (excluding portions of expert testi-
mony based on "skewed data sample"); cf In re Japanese Elec., 723 F.2d at 282 (criticizing
trial court for ignoring expert's uncontradicted affidavit stating all data he relied on "were
of the type on which experts in field would reasonably rely").
84. See Head v. Lithonia Corp., 881 F.2d 941, 944 (10th Cir. 1989) (reversing trial
court that admitted expert testimony without such a preliminary determination).
85. For example, in making business decisions, planners will often use for checks and
confirmation data that is not reliable enough to be the primary basis of a major decision.
Even the data that is used in the most important decisions may not be suitable for use in
preparing financial statements to be distributed to the public. See Evans, supra note 69, §
3.3(b).
86. Tyler J. Bowles & W. Cris Lewis, A Note on the Credibility ofFinancial Data Used
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their names to financial statements, they give one of three dis-
tinct levels of assurance that the statements are accurate . 7 CPA-
compiled financial statements carry the lowest level of assur-
ance." In a compilation engagement, the CPA essentially takes
the client's raw numbers and compiles them into the customary
forms for financial statements. 89 The resulting statement carries
a disclaimer that the CPAs involved "have not audited or re-
viewed the accompanying financial statements and, accordingly,
do not express an opinion or any other form of assurance on
them."9 ° CPA-reviewed financial statements give more assurance.
To prepare them, the CPA firm performs a limited inquiry and
limited analytical procedures designed to give some (although far
from complete) assurance that the financial statements are accu-
rate. 91 The statement of the CPAs gives essentially negative as-
surance, stating that the CPAs are "not aware of any material
modifications that should be made to the accompanying financial
statements in order for them to be in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles."92 The authors note that while the
formal assurance given by such statements is quite limited, most
CPAs, for reasons of professionalism as well as potential liability,
go beyond the minimum and conduct quite extensive investiga-
tions when preparing CPA-reviewed statements. 93 The gold stan-
dard, of course, is audited financial statements, in which the ac-
countants thoroughly and systematically investigate the
transactions underlying the numbers. 94
This leads to the obvious question: What types of financial
statements can experts rely upon when they testify as to lost prof-
its? Professors Bowles and Lewis, the authors of the article dis-
cussed above, give some guidance but no definite answer. They
in Lost-Profit Appraisals, LITIG. ECON. DIG., Spring 2006, at 51, available at http://www.
nafe.net/LER/1l-2-5.pdf.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 52.
89. See id. at 52-53.
90. 2 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
AR § 100.17 (1993). While this literally (and in terms of the accountants' legal liability)
means "garbage in, garbage out," the authors note that the mere fact that a CPA firm is
willing to have its name associated with the statements is an indication that "there is
some likelihood" that the statements are accurate. Bowles & Lewis, supra note 86, at 53.
91. See Bowles & Lewis, supra note 86, at 53-54.
92. 2 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 90, at AR § 100.35.
93. See Bowles & Lewis, supra note 86, at 54.
94. See id. at 54-55.
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conclude that CPA-compiled financial statements should be used
"with caution," although they are better than statements that
have been prepared with no CPA involvement. 95 CPA-reviewed
statements, they conclude, can be used "with a moderate level of
assurance that the financial assertions contained in them are ac-
curate."96 Obviously, audited statements are preferred.
97
All of this leaves the question of what the court should do when
a party seeks to present expert testimony that relies on un-
audited financial statements. The answer, of course, is that the
court should consider all of the surrounding circumstances. What
other assurances are there of the accuracy of the statements?
Conversely, what incentive did the person who prepared them
have to falsify the statements, or merely take advantage of the
flexibility inherent in generally accepted accounting principles,9"
to show high (or low) profits? If the financial statements were
prepared for tax purposes, there was probably an incentive to un-
derstate profits. If they were prepared to persuade investors to
invest in the enterprise or lenders to lend to it, there may have
been the opposite incentive.
Similar considerations apply with respect to other types of data
that experts use to project lost profits. Courts have to look not
only at the fact that others use this type of data, but also at the
purpose for which they use it. The fact that professionals accept
or use certain data does not necessarily mean they rely on it. For
example, businesses often make sales projections which they
know are only educated guesses as to what actual sales will be.99
They then make every effort to limit their reliance on these pro-
95. Id. at 55.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. The flexibility in generally accepted accounting principles is a problem with au-
dited financial statements as well as with unaudited statements. See, e.g., ROBERT W.
HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW STUDENTS: ESSENTIAL
CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS § 6.20 (4th ed. 2006) (explaining how profits may be in-
creased or decreased without violating generally accepted accounting principles).
99. See, e.g., N. Dade Cmty. Dev. Corp. v. Dinner's Place, Inc., 827 So.2d 352, 353 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing award of lost profits based on sale projections court charac-
terized as "little more than an unsupported wish list").
One business school professor, writing in an academic journal, puts it more strongly:
"Most executives would agree that any given new product forecast will be wrong. In fact,
many executives characterize new product forecasting as an inaccurate endeavor." Ken-
neth B. Kahn, An Exploratory Investigation of New Product Forecasting Practices, 19 J.
PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 133, 133 (2002).
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jections, using such devices as sale-or-return purchases, limiting
commitments to minimum purchases necessary,'00 initially mar-
keting products only in limited markets,1"' or simply launching
new products in spite of what the sales forecasts say with the
hope that the profits from the winners will more than offset the
losses from the losers. 10 2 Moreover, businesses generally use more
than one sales forecasting technique, comparing the results of one
test with those of another. 103 In striking an expert's testimony as
to lost profits from a contract breach, one court said: "This case is
a good example of the unreliability inherent in basing an opinion
on a marketing estimate." 10 4
Bankers often make loans on the basis of loan applications con-
taining projections as to sales, revenues, profits, and the like. 105
This does not mean, as a few courts have mistakenly stated,0 6
that the bankers relied on these projections in making their
credit decisions. This misunderstands the nature of the lender's
relationship with its customer. The lender is little concerned with
whether the borrower is profitable or unprofitable. The lender is
concerned with whether the loan will be repaid. As long as there
is sufficient revenue for that, the lender has only limited concern
as to whether the business will be spectacularly successful or
whether it earns only enough to repay the loan.0 7
How one characterizes the "type" of data also affects whether it
is of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Real es-
100. See, e.g., Mid-Am. Tableware, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., 100 F.3d 1353, 1372 (7th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the buyer who projected strong sales for product had made no
commitment to purchase beyond the initial order).
101. See id. at 1373 (noting that product was carried in only half of the witnesses'
stores).
102. See Peter N. Golder, Insights from Senior Executives about Innovation in Interna-
tional Markets, 17 J. PROD. INNOVATION MGMT. 326, 332 (2000).
103. See Kahn, supra note 99, at 138.
104. Sun Ins. Mktg. Network, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1249
(M.D. Fla. 2003).
105. See Am. Road Equip. Co. v. Extrusions, Inc., 29 F.3d 341, 344 (8th Cir. 1994) (not-
ing that the defendant argued that sales projections were inflated to encourage lenders to
continue financing).
106. See, e.g., Wharfside Two, Ltd. v. W.W. Gay Mech. Contractor, Inc., 523 So. 2d 193,
195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the use of projections in consummating financ-
ing made them reliable enough to support a jury verdict).
107. The lender will of course prefer that the borrower be highly successful because a
highly successful borrower will usually generate more additional business (for example,
loans for expansion, sales financing, etc.) than a borrower that is only marginally success-
ful.
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tate appraisers commonly rely upon "comparable sales," but
where the data is characterized as "unverified comparable sales"
or "comparable sales unadjusted for size differences" its use
should be cause for excluding the expert's testimony."0 ' Similarly,
economists and business people often make decisions based on
sales projections, but where a Ph.D. economist relied on sales pro-
jections that could best be characterized as speculative sales pro-
jections, the court properly excluded his testimony.109 At the
Daubert hearing, the economist admitted that there were firms,
including his own, which could have done surveys, which pre-
sumably would have given more reliable projections, but the cli-
ent did not order such surveys. 1 0
An interesting contrast to the above case-where the expert
failed to get the good data that it appears he could have obtained
without undue expense-is Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc. "' In
that case there was no truly comparable data available, but the
court was so impressed with the expert's efforts to get the best
data available that it admitted his testimony." 2 Professional
wrestler Jesse "The Body" Ventura (later Governor of Minnesota)
sued to recover royalties for the use of his likeness in World
Wrestling Federation videotapes."' To determine the appropriate
royalty rate to be applied to the profits the defendants made from
the sales,'14 the expert surveyed "thousands" of licensing agree-
ments involving sports and entertainment personalities." 5 The
court recognized that none of the agreements was "on all fours"
with the subject deal, but it nevertheless held that the expert's
methodology was reliable enough that his testimony should be
admitted." 6 This is consistent with my earlier premise that in de-
ciding whether the expert is qualified to make the analysis, the
court should consider what is at stake in the case and be more
108. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 83 F. Supp. 2d 318, 324-25 (N.D.N.Y.
2000).
109. See Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. Choicepoint, Inc. 102 S.W.3d 366, 383-85 (Tex. App. 2003).
110. Id. at 383; see also TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 732-33 (10th
Cir. 1993) (holding that an economist could not rely on a marketing report where he knew
"little or nothing at all about" the author of the report).
111. 65 F.3d 725 (8th Cir. 1995).
112. See id. at 734.
113. Id. at 728.
114. Normally royalties are based on gross sales revenues, but data on gross revenues
was unavailable, so royalties were computed on net profits. See id. at 734.
115. Id.
116. See id.
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demanding when the stakes are higher. In the same way, courts
should require the expert to base his or her testimony on the best
data available under the circumstances, taking into account such
factors as the cost of obtaining better data, the client's resources,
and the amount at stake in the case.117 An expert who has gone to
extra lengths to get the best available data should be given the
benefit of the doubt, whereas an expert who has not gathered and
dealt with all the reasonably available data (favorable and unfa-
vorable) should be viewed with suspicion.
Courts have been particularly concerned (and justly so) when
the expert relies on projections and other soft data supplied by a
party with a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation.
118
A few courts have said that this is not a cause for excluding the
testimony but is something that can be corrected on cross-
examination.119 Other courts, however, have excluded the testi-
mony where the expert failed to take reasonable steps to verify
the data provided by the client. Where an expert relied on sales
projections made by his client's president, a U.S. district court
held that the testimony should have been excluded under
Daubert, saying that "Rule 703 'implicitly requires that the in-
117. Cf. Q Sales & Leasing, LLC v. Quilt Protection, Inc., No. 01 C 1993, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 21610, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2004) (holding that where defendant had
failed during discovery to produce reliable records, defendant could not complain of the
expert's reliance on the records that were produced).
In Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964), affd,
351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), the court allowed an inference that because the plaintiff was
one of four suppliers of fish food to the state, it would have, absent the antitrust violation,
obtained one-fourth of the state's business. Id. at 400-01. While this would not have been
reasonable in a case with more at stake, this case involved damages of $18,900 (trebled to
$56,700), id. at 401, and therefore, it seems quite reasonable that the court did not require
more extensive proof.
118. See, e.g., Mid-Am. Tablewares, Inc. v. Mogi Trading Co., 100 F.3d 1353, 1375 (7th
Cir. 1996); Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. Choicepoint, Inc. 102 S.W.3d 366, 384-85 (Tex. App. 2003);
cf. Loeffel Steel Prods., Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc. 387 F. Supp. 2d 794, 807 (N.D. Ill. 2005)
(holding that it was improper for an expert to rely on the client's statements as to produc-
tivity losses).
119. See, e.g., PRS Benefits, LP v. Cent. Leasing Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:03-CV-1183-B,
2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 24135, at *4-6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2004) (holding that a CPA's fail-
ure to verify data provided by a health plan administrator could be dealt with by present-
ing evidence as to its lack of reliability); In re Tasch, Inc., No. 97-15901 JAB, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12368, at *1, *10-11 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 1999) (admitting the testimony of an
expert as to profits lost on breach of contract for sandblasting and painting of semi-
submersible oil rig, in spite of an admission by the expert that he "made no effort to verify
the financial information provided by his client").
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formation be viewed as reliable by some independent, objective
standard beyond the opinion of the individual witness."
' 120
In Chemipal Ltd. v. Slim-Fast Nutritional Foods International,
Inc., the court precluded the testimony of the plaintiffs expert
economist because, among other reasons, he had accepted without
question the data in a report prepared by the plaintiffs advertis-
ing agency."'2 The data was that the market for diet products in
Israel was $100 million per year and that the market for slim-
ming products like those that the plaintiff was to distribute there
was twenty percent of that amount.'22 The report cited a business
information service as the source for its data, and the economist
admitted in his deposition that he had not verified that the ser-
vice had actually reported those numbers because maintaining
the service was expensive. 123 Because the expert's testimony was
the entire basis for the plaintiffs damage assertion, the court
granted the defendant summary judgment.'24
In another case, an economist relied on deposition testimony of
his client's president to determine that the product in question
was "homogeneous" (i.e., that it was of such uniform quality that
consumers did not distinguish among brands).' 25 The court ex-
cluded the economist's conclusion, accepting the opposing expert's
contention that "it is not acceptable methodology for an economist
to rely on deposition testimony of an interested party where ob-
jective evidence and analysis exists [sic]."12
It is clear that the court must exercise some oversight on the
data that goes into the expert's opinion. Otherwise the advocate
who is willing to push the envelope will be able to get before the
jury the sort of testimony that one court excluded with this de-
scription:
120. ID Security Sys. Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 695-
96 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (quoting TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 733 (10th Cir.
1993)).
121. 350 F. Supp. 2d 582, 588 (D. Del. 2004).
122. Id. at 590.
123. Id. at 588, 590.
124. Id. at 597.
125. United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc., 173 F.R.D. 675, 685 (D. Kan.
1997).
126. Id.; cf. TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 732-34 (10th Cir. 1993)
(granting directed verdict where the only damage-evidence was the testimony of an expert
who relied on a marketing study which contained unexplained and unsupported asser-
tions).
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What [the expert] has done is to present his own speculative num-
bers without having tempered them in any way to account for their
"iffy" nature. Those deficiencies involve a fundamental flaw that
causes the overall [expert] opinion to be the Rule 702 equivalent of
what in early computer vocabulary bore the label "GIGO" ("garbage
in, garbage out").'
It should also be noted that in order to prove lost profits with
"reasonable certainty," as the law requires, courts have required
that any calculations be based on "'definite, certain and reason-
able data."' 12' Thus, when experts have relied on bad data, courts
have held that plaintiffs have failed to prove their damages and
have granted summary judgments,' 29 directed verdicts,13 ° judg-
ments n.o.v., 13' and new trials.
132
III. ARE THE EXPERT'S ASSUMPTIONS SUPPORTED
BY THE RECORD?
As the Fourth Circuit put it, "When the assumptions made by
an expert are not based on fact, the expert's testimony is likely to
mislead a jury, and should be excluded by the district court."133
Other courts have agreed, and litigants have often been able to
127. Kay v. First Cont'l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
128. Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940 F.2d 1441, 1452 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Grossberg v. Judson Gilmore Assoc., 395 S.E.2d 592, 594 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)).
129. See Lanphere Enter., Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., No. CV 01-1168-BR, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16205 at *45-47, *64 (D. Or. Jul. 9, 2003) (granting summary judgment for
the defendant where plaintiffs only evidence of damages was an expert's testimony that
was excluded for reliance on faulty data).
130. See TK-7 Corp., 993 F.2d at 732-34.
131. See ID Sec. Sys. Can., Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 622, 696 (E.D.
Pa. 2003) (reducing damages by the amount that was based on testimony that should have
been excluded).
132. See Great Pines Water Co. v. Liqui-Box Corp., 203 F.3d 920, 925-26 (5th Cir.
2000); cf. Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008, 1018-19 (8th Cir.
2001) (upholding grant of new trial where the expert failed to consider the potential com-
petition).
133. Tyger Constr. Co v. Pensacola Constr. Co., 29 F.3d 137, 144 (4th Cir. 1994), quoted
in Three Crowns Ltd P'ship v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 876, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
But see Bic Corp. v. Far Eastern Source Corp., 23 F. App'x 36 (2d Cir. 2001). In the latter
case, the court said that expert testimony may be excluded for being based on unsupported
assumptions only
if it is speculative or conjectural, or if it is based on assumptions that are so
unrealistic and contradictory as to suggest bad faith or to be in essence an
apples and oranges comparison[;] other contentions that the assumptions are
unfounded go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the testimony.
Id. at 38 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
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exclude expert testimony by arguing that the expert's opinion was
based on unfounded assumptions.1 34 The attorney calling an ex-
pert has to ensure there is support for the premises on which the
expert bases his or her opinion. In the published opinions exclud-
ing expert testimony, it is difficult to tell why the lawyer let the
expert base his or her opinion on such shaky foundations. There
are undoubtedly instances in which it is just an oversight. That
is, the lawyer fails to realize that the opinion is based on assump-
tions that are open to challenge. More often, it's likely that the
data needed to support the expert's opinion simply is not avail-
able. Or, if it is available, it is so costly to obtain that the plain-
tiffs team decides not to spend the money. 135 But in many cases it
134. See, e.g., McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting
in pre-Daubert case that witness assumed based on "experience plus inflation" that sales
would grow at forty-one percent per annum); JMJ Enters., Inc. v. Via Veneto Italian Ice,
Inc., No. 97-CV-0652, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5098, at *21-22 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1998) (ex-
pert projected sales by eight subdistributors solely on the basis of unsupported testimony
as to sales by one of the eight); Kay v. First Cont'l Trading, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 772, 775-76
(N.D. Ill. 1997) (statistician assumed an employee would have a five to 7.5 year career as a
trader at the defendant-firm, despite that the average tenure of traders at that firm was
2.16 years); De Jager Constr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 938 F. Supp. 446, 453 (W.D. Mich.
1996) ("Without any evidence to support his position, [expert] made the enormous assump-
tion that [one defendant] took money at the same rate as [another defendant as to whom
there was evidence]."); see also Schonfeld v. Hilliard, 218 F.3d 164, 174 (2d Cir. 2000) (list-
ing eight unsupported assumptions on which expert's profit projections were based); Am.
Road Equip. Co. v. Extrusions, Inc., 29 F.3d 341, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing part of
damages award that was based on the testimony of an expert who assumed without sup-
port that 1989 projections were valid for 1990); Three Crowns Ltd. P'ship v. Salomon
Bros., Inc., 906 F. Supp. 876, 893-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (excluding the testimony of a "'lead-
ing academic' in the field of financial economics" because it was based on unsupported as-
sumptions as to certain markets and trades); Colorado v. Goodell Bros., No. 84-A-803 1987
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14549, at *10-11 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 1987) (holding in pre-Daubert deci-
sion, the assumption that admittedly collusive prices were non-collusive made an expert's
damage model too speculative to support the award); Shannon v. Crowley, 538 F. Supp.
476, 482 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (finding no support for MIT economics professor's assumption
that prices would allow plaintiff to break even or make a profit); Halliburton Co. v. E. Ce-
ment Corp., 672 So. 2d 844, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (finding speculative the assump-
tion that plaintiff would have chartered a ship and gone into the containerized cargo busi-
ness); Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 489 N.Y.S.2d 939, 948 (App. Div. 1985), affd in part,
493 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1986) (finding inconceivable the assumptions that various expenses
would be certain percentages of revenues); cf. Morris v. Homco Int'l, Inc., 853 F.2d 337,
344 (5th Cir. 1988) (reversing award based on special master's report because report as-
sumed without basis that plaintiff would have made certain sales and charged the same
prices as competitors). But see Polymer Dynamics, Inc. v. Bayer Corp., 67 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. (West) 201, 205 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (finding reasonable the assumption that a business
will expand while the likelihood and extent of the expansion are issues that should be ar-
gued to jury); Berk-Cohen Assocs. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 94-3090, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3789, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2004) (accepting testimony based on assump-
tion that a termite control contract would remain in effect for thirty years).
135. See, e.g., Chemipal v. Slim-Fast Nutritional Foods Int'l, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 582,
590, 597 (D. Del. 2004) (excluding expert testimony where economist took data from a re-
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is likely the lawyer knew the actual data would not have been as
favorable as the assumptions, so the lawyer decided to roll the
dice and try to get the expert's opinion in.
Lithuanian Commerce Corp. v. Sara Lee Hosiery..6 illustrates
the way some courts react to unsupported assumptions. Sara Lee
Corporation ("Sara Lee") donated "a large volume of pantyhose to
an international relief organization." '137 This good deed did not go
unpunished. Sara Lee had made Lithuanian Commerce Corpora-
tion, Ltd. ("Lithuanian Commerce") its exclusive distributor in
Lithuania, and while none of the donated pantyhose were sent di-
rectly to Lithuania, 3 ' they were distributed in neighboring coun-
tries and were brought into Lithuania by black marketeers. These
black marketeers undercut Lithuanian Commerce's prices.139
Lithuanian Commerce apparently threatened to sue Sara Lee,
but the dispute was settled when Sara Lee promised to give
Lithuanian Commerce a large quantity of pantyhose that Sara
Lee had manufactured in Mexico.'40 When the Mexican pantyhose
proved defective, Lithuanian Commerce sued Sara Lee, seeking
the profits it would have made had the pantyhose been of the
quality promised.' Sara Lee filed a motion in limine to exclude
the testimony of six of Lithuanian Commerce's expert witnesses,
including that of its damages expert.'42 The magistrate judge ex-
cluded the testimony of some of the experts but ruled that the
damages expert's testimony was "shaky, but admissible."' This
port by client's advertising agency without verifying it through the business information
service from which it was supposedly derived because maintaining the service was "expen-
sive").
In Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Pataki, 83 F. Supp. 2d 318 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), a
real estate appraiser's testimony was excluded because, among other reasons, he admitted
that because of budget constraints he had not done a complete analysis of each of the com-
parable sales he relied on in forming his opinion. Id. at 320, 327. The court said of this:
"while the court is sympathetic to these constraints, the fact remains that the other ap-
praisers [who testified] were operating under similar constraints; but that did not prevent
them from developing formulas and presenting data which the court deems reliable for
purposes of Daubert." Id. at 327.
136. 179 F.R.D. 450 (D.N.J. 1998).
137. Id. at 454. Actually, several affiliated organizations, all bearing the Sara Lee
name, were involved in the transactions and the subsequent lawsuit. Id.
138. The opinion does not state directly that none of the contributed pantyhose were
sent directly to Lithuania by the relief organization, but it is strongly implied. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 455.
143. Id. at 456, 458.
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expert was a CPA with "several advanced degrees" and experi-
ence both with the Internal Revenue Service and in private prac-
tice,"' but in calculating the damages, he made a number of as-
sumptions that were not supported by the evidence and in fact
looked like little more than guesses. He assumed "with no appar-
ent basis" that Lithuanian Commerce had a ten percent share of
the pantyhose market in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and that
the market share in Lithuania would increase by one percent a
year.145 Extrapolating from data for U.S. women compiled by an
American trade organization, he assumed that "Baltic women
consume ten pair of pantyhose a year."'46 Combining the testi-
mony of a former Sara Lee employee that Sara Lee had had a few
customer relationships that lasted between eighteen and twenty-
four years with other testimony that Lithuanian Commerce was
an above-average distributor, the expert assumed that Lithua-
nian Commerce would retain its position in its markets for simi-
lar periods.147 The cumulative effect of all of these assumptions
was that the district judge reviewing the magistrate's decision
held that the testimony was so unreliable that it would be inad-
missible even without the application of the Daubert standard.'48
Courts have recognized that experts with fine credentials, as-
sociated with the finest of business and academic institutions,
will base their projections on the most unrealistic of assump-
tions.149 In one case, two firms entered into a joint venture to pro-
duce a direct mail publication advertising automobiles. 5 ° They
began their venture in Cleveland and initially signed fifteen ad-
vertisers to contracts.' 5 ' When all but three advertisers left them,
they tried New Orleans and Baton Rouge.'52 Obtaining no adver-
tisers at all in those cities, they tried San Antonio and Austin.'53
144. Id. at 458.
145. Id. at 461.
146. Id. at 458.
147. See id. at 460.
148. Id. at 462 (citing prior Third Circuit cases excluding expert testimony that was
based on unreliable data and assumptions).
149. See, e.g., De Jager Constr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 938 F. Supp. 446, 455 (W.D. Mich.
1996) (accusing a CPA with credentials as Certified Fraud Examiner as having a "modus
operandi of making unsupported assertions and projections").
150. Target Mkt. Publ'g, Inc. v. ADVO, Inc., 136 F.3d 1139, 1140 (7th Cir. 1998).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1141.
153. Id.
[Vol. 41:379
PROVING LOST PROFITS
In that joint market, they got one advertiser. 154 At that point, one
of the joint venturers told the other it was backing out of the
deal.155 Refusing to accept that they had a losing product, the
other venturer sued in federal court, claiming as damages its
share of the profits it would have made if it had gone on with the
project.156 The defendant moved for summary judgment on the
basis that the damages were less than the $50,000 required for
diversity jurisdiction. 15 7 In response the plaintiff sought to intro-
duce the expert report of an accountant and business appraiser
from one of the world's largest and most respected accounting
firms."' The expert opined that if the defendant had not backed
out, the venture would have earned $1.4 million in profits. 159 To
reach this conclusion, he assumed that the publication would
penetrate into forty-nine marketing zones, that it would obtain
fourteen advertisers per zone, and that all of these advertisers
would pay the publication's full advertising rate. 6 ° The district
court held that these assumptions rendered the expert's report
insufficient not only to show that the damages would have been
the amount claimed, but even to show that the damages would
have reached the $50,000 jurisdictional amount. 161 The plaintiff
argued that the expert's assumptions were based on projections
the defendant itself had made, but the appellate court pointed out
that these numbers were goals, not predictions. 16
2
In another case, a federal court excluded the testimony of an
economics professor from CalTech with a Ph.D. from M.I.T. be-
cause he based his complex and obviously painstakingly created
economic model on assumptions that the court characterized as
"highly questionable."163 Another professor, this time a marketing
professor whom the court characterized as having "an impressive
list of qualifications" and as "a marketing expert to be consulted
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1142.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1144.
161. Id. at 1141.
162. See id. at 1145.
163. Johnson Elect. N. Am. Inc. v. Marbuchi Motor Am. Corp., 103 F. Supp. 2d 268,
273, 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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across a broad spectrum of industries" 16 4 had his testimony ex-
cluded, in part because he assumed, without sufficient support,
that the product in question, a premium women's shave gel,
would have achieved the same market coverage as the plaintiffs
men's shave gel. 165
In a pre-Daubert breach of contract action, the Fourth Circuit
held that a district court was within its discretion in excluding
the testimony of a damages expert "on the grounds that it was
based on assumptions which were speculative and not supported
by the record."'66 To calculate lost profits, the expert assumed
that the breach of an automobile distributorship agreement had
set back by two years the distributor's attempts to establish new
dealers. 167 His damage model therefore assumed that in each of
the years in question the distributor had the same number of
dealers it actually had two years later. 168 There was no support in
the record for that assumption. 169
Other assumptions that courts have been unwilling to accept
because the record failed to support them include an assumption
that a trend of increasing sales or profits would continue, 7 ° as-
sumptions as to the costs of buildings and equipment,'7 ' data as
to comparable sales of real estate,'72 assumptions that subcon-
tractors would be found and that they would be as successful as
the existing subcontractor,'73 assumptions that a terminable con-
tract would not be terminated, 1 4 an assumption that a supplier
164. Pfizer, Inc. v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., No. 97C-04-037-WTQ, 1999 Del. Super
LEXIS 330, at *15 n.9 (Sept. 2, 1999).
165. Id. at *16-17, *24-25.
166. E. Auto Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 795 F.2d 329, 337 (4th Cir.
1986).
167. Id. at 337-38.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See In re Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 206 B.R. 142, 165-66 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
171. See KW Plastics v. United States Can Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d 1289, 1293 (M.D. Ala.
2001).
172. See Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 83 F. Supp. 2d 318, 323, 327
(N.D.N.Y. 2000).
173. See De Jager Constr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 938 F. Supp. 446, 454 (W.D. Mich.
1996).
174. See Hiller v. Mfrs. Prod. Research Group of N. Am., Inc., 59 F.3d 1514, 1529 (5th
Cir. 1995).
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would reduce its price, 175 and assumptions that competitors
would not enter the market. 1
76
Merely having support in the record for the assumptions is not
enough. The support has to be solid. It cannot itself be based on
someone else's assumptions. Where an airline breached a contract
to sell travel coupons, which the plaintiff had planned to use for a
variety of promotional activities, the plaintiffs expert witness
tried to show how much the plaintiff had lost because the breach
had prevented it from using the coupons for supermarket promo-
tions.177 In calculating the lost profits, the expert assumed that
the plaintiff would enter into ten supermarket promotions a year
using the coupons, that the average profit for each certificate re-
deemed would be thirty dollars, and that thirty percent of the
customers purchasing a certificate would also purchase a com-
panion ticket. 17 All of these numbers were based on the testi-
mony of the president of the plaintiff corporation. The court ex-
cluded the expert's testimony because the president's predictions
were unreliable. 179 The president had admitted he had no experi-
ence in supermarket promotions. 0
Defendants can also use the expert's unsupported assumptions
to argue the plaintiff has failed to prove its case with sufficient
certainty.' This approach worked when the Resolution Trust
Corporation ("RTC") sued a law firm, alleging that the firm had
caused the RTC a loss by failing to advise a savings and loan,
which later became insolvent, that certain junk bond purchases
175. See id. at 1528.
176. See Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008, 1018 (8th Cir.
2001) (upholding grant of new trial where expert failed to consider potential competition);
Cent. Office Tel., Inc. v. AT&T, 108 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 1997); Heary Bros. Lightning
Prot. Co. v. Lightning Prot. Inst., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1066 (D. Ariz. 2003) (excluding
expert testimony based on the assumption that there were no potential competitors).
177. Real Estate Value Co. v. USAir, Inc., 979 F. Supp. 731, 734, 744 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
178. Id. at 744.
179. See id. at 734, 744.
180. Id. at 744.
181. See, e.g., Hiller v. Mfrs. Prod. Research Group of N. Am., 59 F.3d 1514, 1524-25
(5th Cir. 1995) (finding insufficient certainty where expert testimony was based on the
unsupported assumption as to plaintiffs future sales); Fifth Third Bank of W. Ohio v.
United States, 55 Fed. Cl. 223, 241 (2003) (holding that an unfounded assumption "ren-
ders plaintiff's model speculative as a matter of fact and law"); Endersby v. Schneppe, 596
N.E.2d 1081, 1084 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("Unless the figure is substantiated by calcula-
tions based on facts available or in evidence, the courts will properly reject it as specula-
tive and uncertain.") (quoting ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS
§ 5.4 (2d ed. 1981)).
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were illegal.'82 The RTC's expert calculated damages by assuming
that if the law firm had advised the savings and loan it could not
legally purchase junk bonds, the savings and loan would have
purchased bonds graded BBB because those bonds were "the clos-
est substitute to junk" it could legally have purchased.'83 The
court, however, refused to accept this reasoning, finding "the re-
cord simply devoid of any evidence to show-much less, create
'reasonable certainty'-that [the institution] would have bought
BBB bonds (or any other single investment) but for the alleged
negligence of the defendants."'" It granted a summary judgment
in favor of the law firm. 185
Even before Daubert, courts held that unfounded assumptions
could be grounds for excluding expert testimony,186 for reversal on
appeal, 187 or for granting a summary judgment, 8 8 directed ver-
182. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, 853 F. Supp. 1422, 1424
(S.D. Fla. 1994).
183. See id. at 1425.
184. Id. at 1425-26.
185. Id. at 1430. In Maiz v. Virani, 253 F.3d 641, 650, 664-65 (11th Cir. 2001), the
court arguably reached a contrary conclusion. It allowed an expert to use a broad-based
real estate investment trust (REIT) index to conclude that the plaintiffs, Mexican nation-
als, would have earned a 12% per annum return on their money if they had not invested it
in the defendants' fraudulent development scheme. There was no basis for assuming they
would have invested in REITs (or any other American real estate) other than that they
invested in it in this and other instances. The court said:
[Tihe fact Plaintiffs did invest in U.S. real estate on this occasion is persua-
sive evidence that they had earmarked the funds they contributed to the De-
fendants specifically for U.S. real estate. Although that proposition may be
debated (and indeed, Defendants challenged it vigorously during cross-
examination), it is enough to support the admission of [the expert's] testi-
mony, especially in conjunction with evidence that some Plaintiffs actually
did invest in U.S. real estate on other occasions.
Id. at 664.
Maiz and Resolution Trust Corp. are not necessarily inconsistent, however. Maiz in-
volved a Daubert challenge to the expert's testimony, rather than a challenge that the
damages had not been proved with reasonable certainty. Moreover, the REIT index used
by the expert in Maiz was a broad index appropriate to measure the performance of U.S.
real estate generally, see id. at 664, whereas in Resolution Trust Corp. the yardstick used
by the expert measured only one of many different types of investments that the institu-
tion could have invested in, see 853 F. Supp. at 1424-25.
186. Shannon v. Crowley, 538 F. Supp. 476, 483-84 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (granting motion
in limine where the damages calculation was based on unsupported assumptions).
187. See Am. Road Equip. Co. v. Extrusions, Inc., 29 F.3d 341, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1994)
(reversing trial court decision based in part on the testimony of an expert who based a
profits forecast on unsupported assumptions and failed to account for adverse facts).
188. See Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697, 703, 707 (N.D. Cal.
1979) (granting summary judgment where plaintiffs damage model was excluded because
of defects in a survey).
[Vol. 41:379
PROVING LOST PROFITS
dict is9 or judgment n.o.v.,' 90 for reducing a jury verdict,191 or for
holding that the plaintiff failed to prove damages with reasonable
certainty. 19 2 The classic case in this regard is Southern Pacific
Communications Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 193 In
spite of an elaborate computer model,'94 which the plaintiffs' ex-
perts developed to compute damages, the court held that they had
not proven their lost profits with reasonable certainty. 9 ' Taking
language from the Supreme Court of the United States's opinion
in Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,'96 the court noted that:
"Although a plaintiff may make a 'just and reasonable' approxi-
mation of the amount of damages based on 'relevant data,' a
damage claim cannot be based upon mere 'speculation or guess-
work."197 After considering at length the assumptions the plain-
tiffs' experts had used to construct their damages model,9 ' the
court held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had
189. See, e.g., Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 911-13
(2d Cir. 1962) (affirming directed verdict where plaintiff failed to establish reasonableness
of assumptions underlying damage calculations).
190. See Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. Am. Safety Prods., Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 601 (6th Cir.
1987) (upholding a grant of judgment n.o.v. where an expert assumed without basis that
plaintiffs could meet sales targets); E. Auto Distribs., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc.,
795 F.2d 329, 338-39 (4th Cir. 1986) (affirming judgment n.o.v. on one part of plaintiffs
case where expert testimony was excluded because of, inter alia, unsupported assump-
tions); R.S.E., Inc., v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 954, 965-71 (M.D. Pa. 1981)
(granting judgment n.o.v. where plaintiffs damages model contained incorrect assump-
tions); Beverly Hills Concepts, Inc. v. Schatz & Schatz, 717 A.2d 724, 740 (Conn. 1998)
(remanding case with instructions to enter judgment for defendants because damages tes-
timony was based on unsupported assumptions).
191. See Hiller v. Mfrs. Prod. Research Group of N. Am., Inc., 59 F.3d 1514, 1524-25
(5th Cir. 1995) (modifying jury verdict resulting from expert testimony based on unsup-
ported assumption as to plaintiffs future sales); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v.
Cont'l Baking Co., 942 F.2d 1332, 1341 (9th Cir. 1991) (reducing verdict on appeal to the
extent it was based on a national accounting firm's unsupported assumption as to profit
margin), amended, in part, on reh'g, 981 F.2d 1023 (1992); Larsen v. Walton Plywood Co.,
390 P.2d 677, 689 (Wash. 1964) (granting remittitur where the verdict was based on ex-
pert testimony using unsupported assumptions as to potential sales).
192. See Beverage Canners, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 372 So. 2d 954, 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979) (awarding nominal damages where damages-expert made multiple unsupported as-
sumptions); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. P.M. Video Corp., 730 A.2d 406, 420-21 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (holding that damages were not proved with reasonable cer-
tainty where experts relied on projections but ignored "caveats, contingencies, and as-
sumptions" contained in the reports).
193. 556 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1982).
194. See id. at 1074-76.
195. Id. at 1098.
196. 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
197. 556 F. Supp. at 1075 (quoting Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264).
198. Id. at 1079-95.
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suffered any damages at all, let alone that they had proven with
sufficient certainty the amount of damages.199
Although they seldom say so, courts undoubtedly realize that
there are many situations where the expert simply has to make
assumptions, estimates, and even guesses.2 °° So why do courts
sometimes exclude the testimony and at other times say it is a
problem that can be dealt with on cross-examination?2 ' Certainly
a lot has to do with the predilections of the individual judge, but
it is also surely true that a court will be more willing to allow the
testimony when the expert can show that he has made a reason-
able, conservative estimate than when it is clear that the expert
is pushing the envelope to get the numbers most favorable to his
client.20 2 Similarly, the court should not allow an expert to make
assumptions if the expert could have obtained the necessary data
without undue effort or expense.20 3 One court excluded an ex-
pert's report where the expert assumed that if a cosmetics dis-
tributor in Kuwait had received the shipments it ordered, it
199. See id. at 1098.
200. In Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452 (3d Cir. 1998), the court allowed
an expert to present a damage model based on the assumption that if the defendants had
not put a building materials distributorship out of business, the distributorship would
have attained the same sales revenues that a branch distributorship owned by one of the
defendants had attained when the plaintiffs principal was its manager. See id. at 486-87.
In Eastern Auto Distributors, Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc., 795 F.2d 329 (4th
Cir. 1986), in an opinion which had upheld the exclusion of part of an expert's testimony
because it was based on unsupported assumptions, the court held that lost profits on an-
other aspect of the plaintiffs breach of contract case had been proven with sufficient cer-
tainty even though the expert assumed that an auto distributor would have established a
dealer in a particular location at a particular time and that the dealer would have
achieved the same level of sales achieved by a dealer established in that location by the
manufacturer. See id. at 339-40. The court acknowledged that "the question is close." Id.
at 339; cf. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Rangen, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 393, 400-01 (D. Idaho
1964) (making "reasonable and conservative inference" that because plaintiff was one of
four suppliers of fish food to the state, plaintiff would have received one-fourth of the
state's business had competitors not bribed state officials), af'd, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1965).
201. See, e.g., Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 401 F.3d 901, 915 (8th
Cir. 2005) (rejecting claim that an expert's focus on selected years skewed the calculation
because that defendant had opportunity to cross-examine).
202. Compare Pfizer, Inc. v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., No. 97C-04-037-WTQ, 1999 Del.
Super LEXIS 330, at *16, *24 (Sept. 2, 1999) (excluding testimony where an expert used
"peak performance [sales] numbers instead of the average baseline") with Nilavar v.
Osborn, 738 N.E.2d 1271, 1289 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (permitting expert testimony where
expert relied on work life tables not subjected to peer review or widely accepted by the sci-
entific community but which had been published for at least nine years and were more
conservative than a study that the opposing expert said was authoritative).
203. How much is at stake and how important the expert's testimony is to the case
should, of course, be major considerations in determining what is undue effort or expense.
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would have sold the full shipments within two months of re-
ceipt. 204 The expert based this assumption on the client's assur-
ances, rather than on the client's records, which could have been
made available to him.20 5
Similarly, unsupported assumptions should not be fatal if the
assumptions were not necessary to the expert's testimony or if the
effect of their not being correct would not have had a major im-
pact. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has
dealt with the question of assumptions in the context of auditors'
reports on financial statements: "[Tihe attention devoted to the
appropriateness of a particular assumption should be commensu-
rate with the likely relative impact of that assumption on the
prospective results. Assumptions with greater impact should re-
ceive more attention than those with less impact." 206
On the other hand, testimony that relies on multiple assump-
tions should be viewed with extreme skepticism. Where one esti-
mate is piled on another, the uncertainty is magnified in a way
that few jurors are likely to understand. 207 For example, suppose
that reasonable estimates of the market for a particular product
are between $50 million and $100 million per year. Then assume
that the estimates of the plaintiffs lost market share are between
ten and twenty percent of the total market and that the estimates
of the plaintiffs profit margin are between four and eight percent
of sales. Further assume that the period over which the plaintiff
lost sales is between three and six years. Based upon these as-
sumptions, the plaintiffs lost profits could vary between $600,000
and $9.6 million.20 8
204. Supply & Bldg. Co. v. Estee Lauder Int'l, Inc., 57 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (West) 1309,
1310, 1315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
205. See id. at 1316; cf. Brooks v. Outboard Marine Corp., 234 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir.
2000) (approving exclusion of expert testimony where expert failed to review relevant and
available evidence).
206. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants, AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide:
Guide for Prospective Financial Information 2004 Guideline 6.31 (quoted in JMJ Enters.,
Inc. v. Via Veneto Italian Ice, Inc., No. 97-CV-0652, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5098, at *21
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 1998)).
207. See Debra L. Worthington, et al., Hindsight Bias, Daubert, and the Silicone Breast
Implant Litigation: Making the Case for Court-Appointed Experts in Complex Medical and
Scientific Litigation, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 154, 159 (2002) (noting that most indi-
viduals do not understand principles of statistical probability); cf. JOHN ALLEN PAULOS,
INNUMERACY: MATHEMATICAL ILLITERACY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 25-48 (1988) (discuss-
ing common failure to understand probabilities).
208. Taking the lowest estimates, 10% of a $50 million market is $5 million in sales.
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When Erie County, New York breached a contract to build a
stadium to be used by the Buffalo Bills, the jury returned a ver-
dict awarding the developers nearly $50 million. 0 9 The appellate
court reversed the award, not only because the damages were
speculative, but also because the damages experts' models had re-
lied on too many assumptions.210 The court distinguished other
cases in which damages verdicts had been based on assumptions,
noting that:
The common thread running through those cases is that only one
variable was involved, i.e., how many of the product would have been
sold. Thus it was certain that the plaintiff would have made money
and the only uncertainty was the amount. The instant case, by con-
trast, is filled with conjecture. The expert had to estimate, first, how
many, if any, events would have been held at the stadium; how many
people would attend each event; and how much each person would
spend on parking and concessions. Additionally, and even more com-
pelling, the expert also had to estimate all expense items.
211
IV. DOES THE EXPERT DEAL ADEQUATELY WITH FACTS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE EXPERT'S THEORY?
Where there are facts inconsistent with the expert's theory or
model, the expert cannot just ignore them.21 2 Sometimes the ex-
Four percent profit on this is $200,000. Over three years, this is $600,000 in lost profits.
Alternatively, the highest estimates of a $100 million market and 20% of this gives $20
million in sales. Profits on this at 8% are $1.6 million. Over six years, this is $9.6 million,
sixteen times the amount calculated using the lower estimates.
209. Kenford Co. v. County of Erie, 489 N.Y.S.2d 939, 942 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985), affd
in part, 493 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1986).
210. See id. at 943-45, 948-49.
211. Id. at 947-48.
212. See, e.g., TK-7 Corp. v. Estate of Barbouti, 993 F.2d 722, 734 (10th Cir. 1993) (not-
ing that expert's projections of large profits were inconsistent with plaintiffs' history of
domestic losses); Handi Caddy, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 557 F.2d 136, 140-42 (8th
Cir. 1977) (ordering a new trial where evidence showed a response rate that was much
lower than that assumed by expert); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338,
1352 (3d Cir. 1975) (noting that expert ignored deteriorating character of area where
plaintiffs business was located and assumed that all losses were caused by unlawful com-
petition, in spite of evidence of increased lawful competition); First Sav. Bank v. U.S. Ban-
corp, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1084-85 (D. Kan. 2000) (noting that expert failed to account
for numerous factors potentially contributing to the bank's decline in profits, including the
loss of a major customer and publicized regulatory problems); Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reu-
ben H. Donnelley Corp., 515 N.E.2d 61, 66-68 (Ill. 1987) (ordering a new trial limited to
the issue of damages because expert did not take into account the fact that the hotel's oc-
cupancy rate was consistently below the city's average); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v.
P.M. Video Corp., 730 A.2d 406, 420 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (noting that experts
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pert will be able to make a reasonable argument that the con-
trary data is wrong or that it does not apply to the question he or
she is addressing. In those cases, the court should admit the tes-
timony and allow the opposing party to attempt to discredit it
through cross-examination or by presenting opposing expert tes-
timony.218 But where the expert simply ignores the data and,
without a reasonable basis, simply chooses other data more fa-
vorable to the party who hired him or her, the testimony should
be excluded.214
The fact that the expert was ignorant of the data does not ex-
cuse the failure to consider it if the expert should have discovered
the data in the course of his or her investigation.215 In United
Phosphorous, Ltd. v. Midland Fumigant, Inc.,216 the court ex-
cluded portions of an expert's testimony because they contained
errors of this type.217 The expert opined that plaintiffs trademark
had no value, in spite of the fact that his own client had paid a
relied on projections made by others "while ignoring the numerous caveats, contingencies,
and assumptions contained in [them]").
213. Even then, it would be preferable for the expert to present an alternative model
using the rejected data so that the trier-of-fact can see how the different data would affect
the outcome. See Patrick A. Gaughan, Economic and Financial Issues in Lost Profits Liti-
gation, in LITIGATION ECONOMICS 175, 184-85 (Patrick A. Gaughan & Robert J. Thornton
eds., 1993) (discussing options and uncertain loss periods). In close cases, whether the ex-
pert has presented such alternative models should factor into the decision whether to ad-
mit or exclude the testimony.
214. See, e.g., Children's Broad. Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 245 F.3d 1008, 1018, 1022
(8th Cir. 2001) (granting a new trial where damages expert, among other things, ignored
the effect of a powerful competitor); De Jager Constr., Inc. v. Schleininger, 938 F. Supp.
446, 455 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (excluding the testimony of an expert with the "modus oper-
andi of making unsupported assertions and projections, of deliberately ignoring documents
and figures which would strike a certified public accountant in the face, and of picking and
choosing among purported facts to maximize plaintiff's damages"); see also Am. Road
Equip. Co. v. Extrusions, Inc., 29 F.3d 341, 344-45 (8th Cir. 1994) (reversing in part a
judgment based on the testimony of an expert who failed to account for a decline in orders
for reasons unrelated to the breach of contract); Thomas J. Mine, Inc. v. Lorillard, Inc.,
878 F.2d 791, 799-800 (4th Cir. 1989) (excluding, in a pre-Daubert case, expert's testimony
in part because of expert's failure to consider certain facts); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v.
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding the
setting aside of a jury verdict, in a pre-Daubert antitrust case, where expert failed to con-
sider effects of lawful competition).
215. See Supply & Bldg. Co. v. Estee Lauder Int'l, Inc., 57 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (West)
1309, 1315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (excluding an expert report where the model was based on
an assumption that the plaintiff had re-commenced operations in June, 1991, but the
plaintiff had claimed in another forum that it had not re-commenced operations until
January 1992).
216. 173 F.R.D. 675 (D. Kan. 1997).
217. Id. at 683.
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premium price for products bearing the plaintiffs trademark.21
The court said of this:
[The expert] was required to evaluate the [plaintiffs] trademark
with little knowledge about the facts of the case, and no knowledge
about the underlying admissions from [the defendant's] president
and sales managers. The court finds that such ignorance of undis-
puted facts violates Daubert's requirement that an expert report and
opinions must be based on "scientific knowledge."
219
The court also found the expert's analysis deficient because he
failed to consider the effect of the advertising the product's manu-
facturer had done, 22' and because he failed to take into account
the fact that a competitor had left the market.221
In Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Commu-
nications Inc.,222 an expert, attempting to establish the profits
lost because of infringements on intellectual property rights, es-
timated one infringer's sales on the assumption that this com-
pany's business-mix was the same as those of the other infringers
for which he had better data.223 While this assumption might oth-
erwise have been justified because the party in question had
failed during discovery to produce records that would have al-
lowed a more precise calculation,224 the court nevertheless ex-
cluded that portion of the expert's report because he had failed to
account for the fact, clearly established by the evidence, that this
party's business mix was substantially different from that of the
other parties on whose data the expert based his calculations.
2 5
While other courts might have treated the expert's report as the
sort of "shaky but admissible evidence" that can be corrected by
"vigorous cross-examination,"226 this court seems correct in ex-
cluding the testimony. The case was already a complex one,227
218. See id. at 683, 687.
219. Id. at 683.
220. See id. at 684, 687.
221. See id. at 686-87.
222. No. 1:95-CV-649-WBH, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21415 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 1999).
223. See id. at *6-8.
224. See id. at *8-9.
225. See id. at *7-10.
226. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ("Vigor-
ous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissi-
ble evidence.").
227. The case was originally filed as a class action antitrust case. See Telecomm Tech-
nical Servs., Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Commc'ns Inc., 172 F.R.D. 532, 536-37 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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and having a battle of experts over this point would only have
added to the jurors' information overload.
Even where the expert's testimony is admitted, failure to deal
with inconsistent evidence can be grounds for reversal on ap-
peal.228 In Leisure Time Entertainment v. Cal Vista229 the Ninth
Circuit held that in a bench trial the trial court had not erred in
admitting the expert testimony of a twenty-year veteran of the
adult film industry with "'specialized knowledge.' 230 Neverthe-
less, the Ninth Circuit vacated the damages award that was
based on that expert's testimony because the expert had treated
certain films as comparable to other films without dealing with
evidence that the other films were longer, had more popular ac-
tors and directors, bore more attractive titles, and had cost more
to produce.231
In a pre-Daubert decision, a federal district court held that an
expert's calculation of antitrust damages for collusive bidding was
"too speculative to support an award of damages" where the ex-
pert's estimate of a hypothetical competitive bid failed to account
for the fact that an engineer had estimated the project cost to be
almost thirty percent more than the amount of the expert's hypo-
thetical bid.232
Often, the failure to deal with inconsistent facts will be a fail-
ure to consider factors other than the defendant's conduct which
may have led to the decline in the plaintiffs profits.233 Courts in
It involved complex telecommunications equipment, see id. at 536, and there were coun-
terclaims involving the infringement of several types of intellectual property rights as well
as the violation of a number of state and federal statutes, see id. at 539 n.16.
228. See, e.g., Cell, Inc. v. Ranson Investors, 427 S.E.2d 447, 450 (W. Va. 1992) (holding
that expert testimony could not prove damages with sufficient certainty where expert
failed to account for the fact that the store operator had no experience and for a market
analysis that said that the proposed store was too small to be profitable).
229. 35 F. App'x 565 (9th Cir. 2002). It has been noted that it is almost impossible for a
judge to commit reversible error by admitting evidence in a bench trial. See, e.g., Rondout
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Coneco Corp., 321 F. Supp. 2d 469, 473-74 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
230. Leisure Time, 35 F. App'x at 566 (quoting United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160,
1167-68 (9th Cir. 2000)).
231. See id. at 568.
232. Colorado v. Goodell Bros., Inc., Civ. A. No. 84-A-803, 1987 WL 6771, at *4 (D. Colo.
Feb. 17, 1987); cf. Shannon v. Crowley, 538 F. Supp. 476, 482 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (noting that
expert's testimony that it was easier to raise prices for tugboat services in San Francisco
than in Los Angeles was inconsistent with the fact that competitive prices in Los Angeles
were higher than monopoly prices in San Francisco).
233. See, e.g., Isaksen v. Vt. Castings, Inc., 825 F.2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting
that plaintiffs damages model failed to account for the diminished demand for woodburn-
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antitrust cases have been more vigilant in looking out for this de-
fect,2 34 but it should be considered in contract, tort, and other lost
profits cases as well. As Judge Posner put it: "We do not allow an-
titrust plaintiffs or any other plaintiffs to obtain damage awards
without proving what compensable damages were actually suf-
fered as a result of the defendant's unlawful conduct."235 Eastern
Auto Distributors, Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of America, Inc.2 36 pro-
vides an example. In a breach of contract action, the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the district court had properly excluded the testi-
mony of the plaintiffs damages expert and granted judgment
n.o.v. on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to present ad-
missible evidence of damages.2 37 In making his damages calcula-
tions, the expert had assumed that, absent the contract breach,
the plaintiff, a distributor of Peugeot automobiles, would have
had the same share of the relevant market in 1977-81 (the period
for which damages were sought) as it had in 1983.238 In making
that assumption, he failed to account for (1) the plaintiffs "admit-
tedly more efficient dealer force in 1983," (2) "the large increase
in demand for Peugeot products during [the] period," (3) "the shift
in demand from gas to diesel automobiles and then back to gas,"
and (4) Peugeot's introduction of new models during the period.2 39
V. HAS THE EXPERT CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS?
This question is different from the other four. There is a great
deal of case law supporting the requirement that the trial judge
ask the other four questions.24 ° There is much less support for
making the trial court look at whether the expert should have
presented alternative scenarios.24 ' This is unfortunate. If courts
are serious about following the Supreme Court's admonition to
ing stoves and changes in the dealer's service costs).
234. See Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, "Speculative" Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH.
L. REV. 423, 446-50 (1995) (discussing various "other causal factors" that courts have con-
sidered in antitrust cases).
235. Isaksen, 825 F.2d at 1165 (emphasis added).
236. 795 F.2d 329 (4th Cir. 1986).
237. See id. at 337-38.
238. Id. at 338.
239. Id.
240. See supra notes 49-239.
241. Cf. Blair & Page, supra note 234, at 461-62 (stating that courts often accept,
rather than require, alternative scenarios).
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require experts to use "the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field," '242
they should require the lost profits expert to show that he or she
has considered alternative scenarios.243 A business strategist
would not plan a business campaign on the assumption that eve-
rything would go according to plan any more than a military
strategist would plan a military campaign according to such a na-
ive assumption. 244 The use of alternative scenarios is so much a
part of analysis and planning in business that Microsoft Excel,
the leading business analysis software, incorporates a "Scenarios"
tool designed for the express purpose of making it easier to de-
velop alternative scenarios.24 Yet in most lost profits cases, the
plaintiffs expert presents a single scenario of the way the world
would have been had there been no breach, or no tort or antitrust
violation, and the defendant's expert presents a single scenario
very different from the plaintiffs.246 While each expert may ac-
knowledge the other's scenario in order to attack it, neither ac-
knowledges that there are many other ways the scene could have
played out.
Juries could understand cases much better if each expert de-
veloped several alternative scenarios based on different assump-
tions. For example, plaintiffs often allege that the defendant's
242. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
243. Cf. Northern Helex Co. v. United States, 634 F.2d 557 (Ct. Cl. 1980). In that case,
the concurring opinion criticized the majority's failure to consider the uncertainty inherent
in "a contract that had almost [thirteen] years to run at the time of breach," saying: "[T]his
assumes ... a certainty in the prediction of future events that we do not rely on in manag-
ing our own affairs." Id. at 565 (Nichols, J., concurring).
244. The old military axiom, "no plan of battle survives first contact with the enemy,"
has become an accepted principle of business as well. See, e.g., JAMES R. ENGLISH, APPLIED
EQUITY ANALYSIS: STOCK VALUATION TECHNIQUES FOR WALL STREET PROFESSIONALS 176
(2001); MARK MCNEILLY, SUN Tzu AND THE ART OF BUSINESS: SIX STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
FOR MANAGERS 80 (2000); BRIAN TRACY, TURBOSTRATEGY: 21 POWERFUL WAYS TO
TRANSFORM YOUR BUSINESS AND BOOST YOUR PROFITS QUICKLY 59 (2003).
245. See STEPHEN G. POWELL & KENNETH R. BAKER, THE ART OF MODELING WITH
SPREADSHEETS 118-21 (2004) (explaining the use of the Excel scenarios tool in business
modeling).
246. See, e.g., E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 999 (5th
Cir. 1976) (noting that plaintiffs expert opined that delays in the delivery of an aircraft
caused plaintiff to lose $23,400,000, while defendant's expert opined that the delay al-
lowed plaintiff to save at least $1,294,000); OWBR LLC v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc.,
266 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1227 (D. Haw. 2003) (noting that plaintiffs expert asserted that
damages were at least $410,645, while defendant's expert calculated them to be between
$29,000 and $38,000); Fera v. Village Plaza, Inc., 242 N.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Mich. 1976)
(noting that plaintiffs expert opined that the store would earn $270,000, while defendant's
expert opined that it would lose money).
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contract breach prevented the plaintiff from bringing a new prod-
uct to market. 47 In such a situation it may be difficult to predict
how large a share of the market the product would have captured
but for the breach.24 A court should be much more willing to al-
low an expert to testify as to the profits lost in such a situation if
the expert presents, for instance, three versions of his or her
model, one showing the lost profits under the most optimistic rea-
sonable assumption as to market share captured, another with a
pessimistic, from the expert's not unbiased viewpoint, assump-
tion, and a third with a middle-of-the-road assumption.
This is not a new idea. Other commentators have long advo-
cated such an approach in certain circumstances,249 but it does
not appear to have been widely used, and courts have not insisted
on it.25 ° They should. Whenever a crucial parameter in the ex-
247. See, e.g., Hiller v. Mfrs. Prod. Research Group of N. Am., Inc., 59 F.3d 1514, 1516-
17 (5th Cir. 1995) (video units for advertising displays); Am. Road Equip. Co. v. Extru-
sions, Inc., 29 F.3d 341, 342-43 (8th Cir. 1994) (new type of gas stove).
248. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Advanced Monobloc Corp., No. 97C-04-037-WTQ, 1999 Del.
Super. LEXIS 330, at *15, *27 (Sept. 2, 1999) (noting that plaintiffs expert opined that the
product would capture 11% market share, while defendant's expert opined that it was
"doomed to end in failure"); Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. ChoicePoint, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 366, 382-84
(Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that plaintiffs expert opined that plaintiff would achieve 15%
market share within four years, while defendant's expert testified that much better-
positioned competitors had failed to achieve similar results).
249. See, e.g., Gaughan, supra note 213, at 184-85. One article suggests that it can be a
method for getting into evidence models that would otherwise be inadmissible because
they use arbitrarily chosen values:
In most instances, the plaintiff cannot predict competitive responses with cer-
tainty. Courts nevertheless often accept damage theories that take account of
competitive responses of others explicitly, even if the estimated magnitude of
the responses is virtually arbitrary. In such cases, the plaintiff typically will
offer several scenarios on differing assumptions, and leave the choice of the
appropriate scenario to the jury. Such an approach makes the jury's choice of
a "conservative" scenario apparently reasonable, despite the inherent arbi-
trariness of the values chosen.
Blair & Page, supra note 234, at 461 (citation omitted).
250. One court even held the use of alternative scenarios against the party presenting
them. In Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. American Safety Products, Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 604
(6th Cir. 1987), the court "buttressed" its conclusion that the damages had not been
proven with sufficient certainty by noting that the plaintiff presented two different scenar-
ios, each of which was based on different assumptions as to expenses and product mix.
In another case, however, a court seems to have invited an expert to amend his report to
present alternative scenarios. In a distributorship termination case, the plaintiffs expert
assumed that, but for the breach, the distributor would have earned profits from the dis-
tributorship until he retired. Swierczynski v. Arnold Foods Co., 265 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810-
11 (E.D. Mich. 2003). When the defendant moved to exclude the expert report on other
grounds, the court pointed out sua sponte that under the applicable state law a plaintiff
under an agreement of indefinite duration may recover profits only for a reasonable time.
Id.
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pert's model is at issue, the court should require that the model
consider alternative values for the parameter.
As an example, consider the situation in which the defendant's
breach prevented a new product from reaching the market (or
from reaching it in time to capture a significant market share).
The plaintiff might want to argue that if the product had reached
the market in time, it would have captured 20% of the market. If
the evidence that it would have captured 20% is less than totally
convincing, which it usually is in such circumstances, the plaintiff
might be better off if it presented damages models showing the
profits it would have earned if it had captured 20%, 15%, and 10%
of the market. Its marketing expert could present the evidence
tending to show that it would have captured 20% of the market,
but its economic expert could present the model showing the prof-
its that would have been earned under all three scenarios.2 15 ' The
defendant's marketing experts would of course argue that the
market share would have been much less, but the defendant's ex-
perts should also be required to present alternative models.
A pre-Daubert case, Miller v. Cudahy Co.,252 presents an excel-
lent example of experts on both sides presenting alternative sce-
narios from which the trier-of-fact could choose the one it believed
to be based on the most reliable estimates of the relevant vari-
ables. The defendant had for many years polluted an aquifer with
salt.253 As a result, the plaintiffs could not grow irrigated corn on
their land, but instead had to grow less profitable crops, such as
milo and wheat, which could be grown without irrigation.254 The
court noted that the computation of the plaintiffs' lost profits
251. Cf. Hiller, 59 F.3d at 1523-24 (concluding that expert's damage calculations,
based on the leases of 800 units, were supported by evidence, but alternative calculations,
based on 1200 units, were not supported); Computer Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Qantel Corp., 740
F.2d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that plaintiffs expert created three different lost profit
scenarios by extrapolating from three different profit and loss forecasts made by defen-
dant); Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130, 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that plain-
tiffs "expert at valuing start-up businesses valued [the company] under different risk sce-
narios"); Chung v. Kaonohi Ctr. Co., 618 P.2d 283, 292-93 & n.ll (Haw. 1980) (noting that
plaintiffs expert presented one scenario in which the net income remained constant and
second in which the net income increased at ten percent per year); Stroud v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co., 37 P.3d 783, 793 (Okla. 2001) (concluding that damages proven with suffi-
cient certainty where plaintiffs expert valued the companies "at different times under dif-
ferent scenarios").
252. 592 F. Supp. 976 (D. Kan. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 858 F.2d 1449 (10th
Cir. 1988).
253. See id. at 982.
254. See id. at 991.
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"rests on the intricate inter-relationship of many factors," such as
the value of the crops that could have been grown, the value of
the crops actually, and the expenses involved in growing the ac-
tual and hypothetical crops.255 The plaintiffs' expert calculated
the lost profits "by six different methods using three basic vari-
ables: yields per acre, prices per bushel, and production costs per
acre."256 His different methods and data produced results ranging
approximately from $1,500,000 to $11,500,000.257 The high num-
ber was based on estimates of yields stated by another of the
plaintiffs' experts, while the low number was based on data ac-
quired from "several independent sources."25 The defendant's ex-
pert calculated damages using two of the same methods as the
plaintiffs' expert but with different numbers for production costs
per acre.25 9 Defendant's expert's calculations showed lost profits
ranging approximately from $940,000 to $1,000,000.260
The court found two of the plaintiffs' expert's six methods to be
the most reliable, but it found that even those contained an un-
supported assumption.2 61 The court replaced the unsupported
data with data supported by the record and repeated the most re-
liable of the expert's calculations.2 62 By the court's calculations,
one method yielded damages of approximately $3,125,000 and the
other damages of approximately $2,995,000, so the court awarded
lost profits damages of $3,060,000, apparently splitting the dif-
ference.263
A damages expert used multiple scenarios in litigation involv-
ing the famous Brennan's Restaurant in New Orleans.264 In viola-
tion of an intra-family agreement, a nephew of the restaurant's
founder opened a competing business several blocks away under
the name "Dickie Brennan's Steakhouse."265 In the suit that fol-
255. Id. at 991.
256. Id.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 991-92.
259. Id. at 992.
260. Id.
261. See id. The expert assumed that 3018 acres would have been used for irrigated
corn, but the court found that the maximum that could have been used for this crop was
2800 acres. Id.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See Brennan's Inc. v. Dickie Brennan & Co., 376 F.3d 356, 372 (5th Cir. 2004).
265. See id. at 359.
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lowed, the operators of the original restaurant claimed that they
had lost profits because potential customers had been confused by
the similar name.266 To prove the number of customers lost, the
plaintiffs' economic expert calculated the original restaurant's
customer counts as a percentage of attendance at the New Or-
leans Convention Center. 67 The expert's premise, which the court
seems to have accepted without question, was that if the ratio be-
tween convention center visitors and customers at the original
Brennan's declined, the decline was due to the name confusion.
268
The expert's model yielded three different lost profits figures,
each representing a different set of assumptions as to the original
restaurant's historical market share.269
In William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. Continental Baking
Co.,27° multiple scenarios in the damages model saved an anti-
trust verdict from being overturned.271 One of the expert's dam-
ages models assumed that but for the antitrust violation the
plaintiff would have had a profit margin of 1.7%.272 The expert
based this assumption on his survey of companies that he alleged
were comparable to the plaintiff.273 The Ninth Circuit held that
this assumption was not sufficiently certain to be a basis for a
verdict because of the lack of similarity between those companies
and the plaintiff.274 The court did, however, hold that there was
sufficient support for the plaintiffs alternative damages model
which used a profit margin of 0.8%, the plaintiffs actual profit
margin during the period in question.275
In another antitrust case, Fontana Pipe & Fabrication v. Am-
eron, Inc.,2 76 the trial court granted the defendant a directed ver-
dict because the plaintiffs damages expert had based his calcula-
266. See id. at 361.
267. Id. at 372.
268. See id.
269. See id. The jury awarded the plaintiffs only a fraction of the amount the expert
opined they had lost. See id. at 361. The use of multiple scenarios did, however, help the
expert's testimony survive a challenge by the defendants, who claimed that his testimony
should have been excluded and that without it the jury verdict could not stand. See id. at
372, 374, 376.
270. 942 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1991), amended in part, on reh'g, 981 F.2d 1023 (1992).
271. See id. at 1341.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. Id.
275. See id.
276. No. 91-35761, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11962 (9th Cir. May 14, 1993).
20071
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tions on unsupported assumptions.2 77 The Ninth Circuit, how-
ever, reversed the directed verdict and ordered a new trial be-
cause the expert had presented four alternative damages scenar-
ios, and two of them contained adequate support.2 7' The expert
would have done better, however, if he had presented even more
damages scenarios. The magistrate who tried the case criticized
the expert's models because they projected damages to infinity,
when the relevant market (for steel pipe) ran in twenty-year cy-
cles.279 The Ninth Circuit held that because the testimony gave
the jury sufficient basis for separating out the profits from the
first cycle, they could have done this in reaching a verdict.28 In
other circumstances, however, courts have been unwilling to re-
quire a jury to make adjustments to the expert's model.2"' So
when the loss period is uncertain, experts would serve their cli-
ents better if they presented alternative scenarios based on the
different loss periods.
In DeLong Equipment Co. v. Washington Mills Electro Minerals
Corp.,2"2 the district court set aside a jury's Sherman Act dam-
ages verdict because the plaintiffs expert based some of his pro-
jections on an assumption the court believed to be unrealistic.2 3
The Eleventh Circuit reversed and reinstated the jury verdict be-
cause the expert had actually presented five different alternative
damage scenarios, and the jury apparently chose a scenario that
did not depend on the questioned assumption and was one of sce-
narios least favorable to the plaintiff.284
277. See id. at *3, *7-10.
278. See id. at *7, *10, *12.
279. See id. at *9.
280. See id.
281. See, e.g., Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1353 (3d Cir. 1975)
(finding that a jury "could not have determined plaintiffs damages by 'just and reasonable
inference' from the evidence presented"); R.S.E., Inc, v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 523 F. Supp.
954, 964-65 (M.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that where projections fail to consider other causes
of losses, the jury cannot adjust projections); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
458 F. Supp. 423, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict
after finding that plaintiffs evidence was insufficient in that any jury verdict rendered
thereon would be the result of speculation), affd sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. I.B.M. Corp.,
636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
282. 990 F.2d 1186 (11th Cir. 1993), amended by 997 F.2d 1340 (1993).
283. See id. at 1204.
284. See id. at 1204-05, 1207; see also Fontana Pipe & Fabrication v. Ameron, Inc., No.
91-35761, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11962, at *7-8 (9th Cir. May 14, 1993) (finding that the
presentation of "a range of estimates does not in itself prove that the figures are overly
speculative").
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When deciding whether to admit expert testimony that is less
than perfect, as almost all expert testimony in lost profits cases
is, courts are faced with the difficult decision whether to exclude
the testimony as misleading or admit it with the hope that cross-
examination will make the jury aware of the weaknesses in the
testimony. But, as discussed above, cross-examination is not the
effective control some courts seem to think it is.2"' In addition to
the weaknesses discussed above, control through cross-
examination requires the jury to either reject the expert's model
in toto or to somehow try to recalculate the damages themselves,
something that usually leads to error.28 6 In a few non-jury cases
in which courts have found serious flaws in the data the expert
used to construct his model, the courts have accepted the expert's
model but recalculated the result using numbers the court
deemed more appropriate. 287 And in others they have corrected
what was itself a flawed model, while accepting the substance of
the expert's testimony.288 This approach should be used sparingly,
if at all. The courts that have been able to use it successfully have
generally been courts sophisticated in business cases, such as
bankruptcy courts and the Court of Federal Claims.289 It is not
something to be done by a judge without a great deal of experi-
ence in business matters, and certainly not by a jury.29 °
If the expert's model presents alternative scenarios, however,
the jury can, when the assumptions underlying the more extreme
285. See supra text accompanying notes 7-35.
286. Based on more than twenty years experience in trying to teach first-year law stu-
dents to calculate damages, I can assure the reader that calculating damages is not some-
thing most people can do without considerable study.
287. See, e.g., Energy Capital Corp. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 382, 401-02 (2000)
(noting that the expert assumed 44.5% of HUD-assisted housing properties used electric
resistance heating and recalculating using 35%); Riley v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 226 F. Supp.
780, 783-84 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (noting that the plaintiffs expert said that a return rate on
the promotion would be 60-90% and defendant's expert said that it would be 1% and cal-
culating damages using a return rate of 25%).
288. See In re Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 206 B.R. 142, 161 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997)
(factoring costs into expert's model that expert had failed to consider).
289. See, e.g., Energy Capital, 47 Fed. Cl. at 402.
290. Cf. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 383 (7th Cir.
1986) (finding no rational basis for judge's reduction of damages from $54 million to $12
million); Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir.
1962) ("It might indeed have been possible for a judge, with days to study the exhibits of
plaintiffs expert, to come up with some rational computation of damages; ... it would be
foolhardy to expect a jury to do so.").
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scenarios have been shown to be doubtful, choose a scenario
based upon a more supportable assumption.
Another advantage to having experts present multiple scenar-
ios is that it alleviates the false impression of certainty that has
troubled many courts.291 For example, when a highly credentialed
economist or accountant takes the stand and states that the
plaintiffs lost profits were $12,719,323.52, a jury of lay people,
unfamiliar with the methods of business modeling, has no idea of
the uncertainties involved in the calculation. When the expert
presents alternative scenarios, a bit of the uncertainty is driven
home to them. This is consistent with the admonition of Judge
Friendly in his oft-cited opinion in Herman Schwabe, Inc. v.
United Shoe Machinery Corp. 292 In upholding the exclusion of the
plaintiffs expert's testimony as to lost profits, Judge Friendly,
more than thirty years before Daubert, noted that it was espe-
cially important to protect juries against expert testimony con-
taining "an array of figures conveying a delusive impression of
exactness in an area where a jury's common sense is less avail-
able than usual to protect it."293
Presenting alternative scenarios is of course no cure-all for the
problems of expert testimony. Experts can still present several
extreme scenarios, giving the least outrageous of them an ap-
pearance of plausibility by labeling it the "conservative" scenario.
But in those cases, courts should be willing to exclude one ex-
pert's testimony in toto because that expert pushed the limits too
far, while admitting the testimony of the other side's expert, if
that expert is more reasonable in her assumptions. The more
courts do this, the more there will be a real incentive to present
scenarios that are realistic.294
291. See, e.g., Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459, 476 (9th Cir. 1977); E. Air
Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 999-1000 (5th Cir. 1976); Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71, 87 (9th Cir. 1969).
292. 297 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1962).
293. Id. at 912, quoted in E. Auto Distrib., Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 795 F.2d
329, 338 (4th Cir. 1986).
294. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1352 (3d Cir. 1975) is an ex-
ample of a court rejecting multiple scenarios because all of them ignored a relevant fact.
The plaintiffs damages experts presented alternative scenarios, but the Third Circuit va-
cated a judgment based on them because both scenarios attributed all of the plaintiffs
losses to the defendant's unlawful competition, whereas it was clear that some of the
losses were attributable to lawful competition. See id.
Similarly, in Johnson Electric North America, Inc. v. Marbuchi Motor America Corp.,
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VI. CONCLUSION
The list of questions discussed in this article is not intended to
be an exclusive list or a checklist. But the questions do emphasize
the principle that should guide the trial court in exercising its
role as gatekeeper: Is the expert presenting a fair model of the
plaintiffs lost profits or is the expert simply trying to, in Judge
Posner's words, "bamboozle the jury"?
No one expects an expert chosen and paid by a plaintiff or de-
fendant to present a balanced, unbiased analysis.295 But it is not
too much to expect the expert to present an analysis that he or
she could defend to a group of his or her peers. If courts want to
keep alive the ideal that expert witnesses really tell the truth,
they need to be willing to exclude bad expert testimony, rather
than depending on cross-examination to weaken it. If the lawyer
introducing the expert testimony believes that the expert's opin-
ion is merely a "first offer," which will later be cut down to a more
appropriate number, there will be pressure for the expert to use
unrealistic numbers in the hope that they won't be cut down too
much. 29
6
Although much of the expert testimony involves technical is-
sues that many judges are unfamiliar with, the trial judge should,
if opposing counsel is competent, be able to get a feel for the kind
103 F. Supp. 2d 268, 277, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), the expert's model contained twenty differ-
ent scenarios, but the court still excluded his testimony because all of the scenarios were
based on assumptions the court deemed unrealistic.
295. See Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions
on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 921 (2003) ("A num-
ber of commentators have observed that because the experts are chosen by the parties, the
system favors the selection of experts with extreme views .... ").
It has been suggested that financial experts testifying as to lost profits may not only
manipulate the data but may manipulate the methodology as well. Tomlin & Merrell, su-
pra note 48, at 304-06.
296. In one case, this strategy backfired. After the jury was unable to reach a verdict,
the court declined to order a new trial and instead entered a judgment n.o.v. for the defen-
dant, saying:
It becomes clear to the court that either plaintiff could not compile a reason-
able damage model or introduce evidence to support a reasonable damage
award, or plaintiff did not choose to do so, opting instead to place an enor-
mous damage figure and one that could not be supported by the evidence in
front of the jury and let them "cut it down." If the former was true, plaintiff
was given every possible opportunity to correct the defects. If the latter was
true, plaintiff seriously abused the good graces of this court and the judicial
process and should not be given a chance to correct his errors.
R.S.E., Inc. v. Pennsy Supply, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 954, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
20071
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
of expert she is dealing with through the briefs and the Daubert
hearing. She should be able to tell whether the expert has made
moderate estimates and explained areas of uncertainty or
whether the expert is pushing the envelope, trying to sell the jury
on an extreme position.
It is widely understood that the system of party-selected expert
witnesses has serious flaws. Most of the proposals, such as wide-
spread use of court-appointed experts, cannot be implemented in
the foreseeable future.29 7 The remedy advocated in this article-
greater scrutiny of individual expert testimony-is simple and
easy to implement. While it will not solve the whole problem, it
will have an effect. If lawyers understand that experts who take
unreasonable positions will have their testimony excluded, law-
yers will more often make their experts conform to the standards.
297. See KAYE, supra note 42, § 10.4.1.
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